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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years, economists and other academics have been
calling for a more flexible, dynamic, market-oriented approach to the
allocation and assignment of wireless spectrum rights. Policymakers have
responded by implementing some meaningful reforms, including the use of
auctions for spectrum assignment and the creation of more flexible and
tradable licenses to allow spectrum to flow dynamically to its highest value
uses. Taken together, the academic literature and the statements (and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, the actions) of policymakers suggest the existence
of a fairly well-formed and comprehensive consensus about key aspects of
spectrum policy.
The National Broadband Plan ("NBP" or "Plan"),I released in March
2010, emphasizes the importance of spectrum policy, and focuses on the
need to reallocate spectrum from less efficient to more efficient uses. The
NBP notes in particular that demand for mobile broadband services is
growing rapidly, and sets a goal of making 500 MHz of additional
spectrum available for mobile broadband uses within the next ten years.2
The NBP proposes several approaches, including improving market
transparency, accelerating the process by which government spectrum is
brought to market, increasing flexibility in certain bands (e.g., Mobile
Satellite Service, or "MSS"), increasing reliance on unlicensed spectrum,
and having the FCC conduct "incentive auctions" to facilitate spectrum
repurposing (e.g., of spectrum currently allocated to broadcast television).
The details of these proposed policies will be defined in rulemaking
proceedings that will affect the markets for mobile broadband and other
communications services for years, if not decades, to come.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the NBP's spectrum policy
proposals in the context of the modern spectrum policy consensus. As
discussed further below, the key points of the modern consensus include
the following: (a) spectrum should be allocated so as to maximize the net
economic benefits (public as well as private) flowing from its use;3 (b)
1. See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN (2010),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [hereinafter NBP]. The
NBP was issued in response to a 2009 congressional directive instructing the FCC to
develop a plan to ensure that every American has access to broadband capability. It makes
recommendations to the FCC, the Executive Branch, Congress, and state and local
governments.
2. Id. at 75.
3. The phrase "net economic benefits" refers to both the private benefits of a service,
which typically are reflected in its market value, and its public benefits (e.g., public safety
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spectrum licenses should be flexible with respect to the technologies used
and the services provided, subject to the ability to police interference
efficiently; (c) spectrum should be tradable, so that spectrum allocations
can adjust dynamically to changes in markets and technologies; and, (d)
government users should face the opportunity costs associated with
spectrum used for public purposes, and have incentives to transfer
underutilized spectrum to the private sector.
To be sure, the spectrum reform consensus is neither all-
encompassing nor fully complete. For example, the question of how much
spectrum should be allocated for exclusive use, as opposed to being
managed through an open or "commons" approach, is hotly debated;4 and,
as discussed at length below, there are important unanswered questions
about government's proper role in facilitating d r amic spectrum
reallocation (i.e., in secondary markets and repurposing).
Upon review, the NBP's spectrum reform proposals track closely with
the modem consensus in some areas, especially with respect to the Plan's
emphasis on the importance of spectrum flexibility and trading. In other
areas, including its embrace of spectrum fees and build-out requirements, it
seems to diverge from the consensus approach. In still other respects,
including specifically its proposals for an active government role in
"market-based" spectrum reallocation, the NBP raises issues around which
a consensus has not yet formed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents a brief overview of spectrum policy in the United States, including
the development of a consensus around the need for market-oriented
reforms. Section III details the primary factors that make reform of
spectrum policy so urgent, including (as the NBP emphasizes) the growing
demand for mobile wireless services and, most recently, mobile broadband.
Section IV discusses the NBP's proposals from both a policy and a market
perspective. Section V presents a brief conclusion.
benefits), which typically are not reflected in market valuations. See, e.g., FCC, Spectrum
Analysis: Options for Broadcast Spectrum, OBI Technical Paper No. 3, June 2010
[hereinafter OBI Technical Paper] at 7, http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-omnibus-
broadband-initiative-(obi)-technical-paper-spectrum-analysis-options-for-broadband-spect
rum.pdf ("When faced with hard choices as to how to allocate limited resources, market
valuation is one useful indicator of appropriate resource allocation. Other indicators, such as
public benefits to society, are also necessary, particularly when evaluating an asset that is
publicly owned.").
4. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Evan T. Leo, The Case for Liberal Spectrum
Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective, GEO. MASON UNIV. LAW & ECON. RES.
PAPER SERIES 10-19, (March 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1585469.
5. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next
Frontier ofProperty Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 549, 549 (2008).
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II. THE SPECTRUM REFORM CONSENSUS
The spectrum reform movement began with the publication of a little-
noticed article by Leo Herzel in 1951.6 More than fifty years later, it has
produced a broad consensus around key principles that should govern
spectrum policy. The first section below discusses the development of the
spectrum reform consensus, and its impact, thus far, on policy. The second
section discusses the limits of the consensus, and the extent to which its
policy implications have not yet been adopted.
A. The Spectrum Reform Movement
For most of the twentieth century, the United States pursued a
command and control approach to spectrum management. Spectrum
licenses were assigned by administrative fiat, and their terms prescribed
both the technologies that could be used and the services that could be
provided. Licenses could be transferred, but only with the FCC's explicit
approval, and generally only in the sizes and for the uses originally dictated
by the FCC. Licensees could not disaggregate or partition their licenses
into potentially more saleable units. Moreover, most licensees could not
lease or share spectrum with third parties. Overall, market forces played
little if any role in determining who could use the electromagnetic spectrum
or what they could do with it.
Beginning in the late 1950s, the command and control reime came
under increasing criticism from academics and policy analysts.' In dozens
of articles and studies, they demonstrated that the traditional approach was
failing to serve the public interest. The process of assigning spectrum by
administrative hearings was not only slow and inefficient, but also created
6. Leo Herzel, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U.
CHI. L. REv. 802 (1951).
7. LAWRENCE J. WmTE, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's
Important, and How to Begin, in COMMUNICATIoNs DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM, 111-
44 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Randolph J. May, eds., 2001),
http://w4.stem.nyu.edu/emplibrary/0001 2.PDF.
8. But see App'n of Bill Welch for Comm'n Consent to Transfer Control of the
Florence, Alabama Non Wireline Cellular Permit to McCaw Commun. of Florence, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 6502 (1988) (reversing the FCC's long-held
prohibition on for-profit trading of "bare" licenses).
9. See Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mobile
Radio Servs. Licensees, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
F.C.C.R. 21831, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 634 (1996) [hereinafter Geographic Partitioning
Report].
10. The seminal contribution was made by Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959), available at http://www.jstor.org/
stable/724927.
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opportunities for politically powerful interests to "game" the process for
their own benefit." The lack of license flexibility locked licensees into
inefficient technologies and prevented them from introducing new
services.12 Prohibitions against leasing or sharing prevented usage rights
from getting into the hands of those most able to put them to productive
use. Studies showed that the system's failings-most famously, the
decades-long delay in the introduction of cellular telephone services-were
slowing technological innovation and costing consumers billions of
dollars. 13
Critics of the command and control approach recommended that
spectrum policy be modified to incorporate market forces.14 Under this
approach, government, rather than licenses, would create property rights,
auction those rights off to the highest bidder, and allow the owners to offer
whatever services consumers demanded, so long as they did not cause
interference for their spectrum "neighbors."' 5 In cases where a pure
property rights approach is inappropriate or politically unachievable (e.g.,
government uses), market-like incentives would be used to the maximum
extent possible.
For many years, market-oriented reform proposals were limited to the
academic journals. By the 1980s, however, the demand for spectrum to
accommodate new wireless technologies, such as cell phones and direct
broadcast satellite television, combined with a growing recognition of the
inequities and inefficiencies of the current system, led to increasing
pressure for reform. Initial efforts were mainly too timid to matter, or-as
was the case with the FCC's brief experiment with assigning licenses by
11. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation of Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990).
12. See "Propertyzing" the Magnetic Spectrum, supra note 7. ("The reality of that
regulation has been a process in which, all too often, the Federal Communications
Commission has discouraged competition, favored incumbents over entrants and innovators,
delayed the development of new technologies, and generally mismanaged a scarce
resource."). Id. at 111.
13. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, 28 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoNoMIC AcTIviTY: MICROECONOMICS 1
(1997). For citations to several of the most significant contributions, see Comments of 37
Concerned Economists, In the Matter of Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through
Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, FCC WT Docket No.
00-230 at 4 n. 2 (rel. Feb. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Comments of 37 Concerned Economists].
14. See, e.g., The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 10.
15. See "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum, supra note 7.
16. See, e.g., Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the
Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499
(1969).
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lottery rather than administrative hearings-simply unsuccessful in
efficiently assigning spectrum to the highest and best use.
In 1991, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration ("NTIA") undertook a major review of U.S. spectrum
policy. The resulting report-U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: Agenda
for the Future 8-concluded that the command and control approach
should be replaced in favor of greater reliance on markets:
NTIA believes that, for most purposes, a spectrum management system
that provides users with both incentives and opportunities to use
spectrum in ways that are economically efficient will produce greater
benefits for society than a centrally planned, highly regulatory system
that attempts a "top down" approach to managing spectrum use ....
For most private-sector users, a choice mechanism suggests itselflt4pat
could be much more efficient than the current system - the market.
Based on this finding, Agenda for the Future made a number of
specific recommendations, including the following: spectrum should be
assigned through the use of competitive bids; licensees should have
increased flexibility in the technologies they use and the services they
offer; trading, leasing, and sharing of spectrum among licensees should be
permitted; and, incentives should be introduced to encourage more efficient
use of spectrum by government agencies.20 In an important sense, Agenda
for the Future represented the first official embrace of the modern spectrum
reform consensus.
The NTIA's recommendations proved to be highly influential,
forming the basis for a bipartisan reform effort during the 1990s and early
2000s, under which Congress, the FCC and the NTIA all took steps to
interject greater flexibility and reliance on market mechanisms into U.S.
spectrum policy. For example, Congress authorized the use of competitive
bidding (i.e., auctions) to assign spectrum to new licensees in 1993.21 The
first spectrum auction, the Narrowband PCS auction, was held in July
17. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users:
Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 533 (1998); see also
Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.L. & ECoN. 727, 728
(1998) (explaining that lotteries resulted in fragmented property rights which took time to
reassemble into more valuable packages).
18. NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY:
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE (1991), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1998/us-
spectrum-management-policy-agenda-future [hereinafter AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE].
19. Id. at 86-87.
20. Id. at 11-19.
21. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
See also FCC, AucTIoNs, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about-auctions
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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1994, generating $617 million in revenues.22 Between 1994 and 2010
subsequent auctions yielded an additional $77.4 billion in net revenue.
Despite some serious missteps, spectrum auctions (in combination with
increased spectrum flexibility) have resulted in the more efficient allocation
of spectrum,24 and significantly accelerated the spectrum assignment
process relative to comparative hearings.2 5
The FCC moved significantly in the direction of greater license
flexibility. For example, unlike the original analog cellular telephone
licenses, digital mobile phone licenses (Personal Communications Services,
or "PCS" licenses), which the FCC auctioned beginning in the mid-1990s,
allowed licensees substantial flexibility in the choice of technology and
services offered. At the same time, the FCC granted cellular licensees
additional flexibility, including the ability to choose their own digital
technology path. Similarly, a licensee for Advanced Wireless Service
("AWS") and 700 MHz spectrum "may provide any services for which its
frequency bands are allocated. . . ."27
The FCC enabled a more robust secondary market for spectrum by
first permitting certain licensees to "disaggregate" and "partition" their
licenses,28 and then later expanding its disaggregation and partitioning
22. Peter C. Cramton, Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS
Auction, 4 J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 267, 267 (1995), http://www.cramton.umd.edu/
papersl995-1999/95jems-money-out-of-thin-air.pdf.
23. See Auctions Summary, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=
auctions all (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
24. See, e.g., Efficiency of FCC Spectrum Auctions, supra note 17; see also Arthur
DeVany, Implementing a Market-Based Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. & EcoN. 627, 629 (1998)
("[A]uctions surely are a better way to issue licenses than the arbitrary ways of the past ...
25. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke ": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy 111-12 (AEl-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies,
Working Paper No. 01-2, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn
?abstract id=286932.
26. Id. at 156-57.
27. 47 C.F.R. § 27.2(a) (2007). Of note, although the FCC intended its Wireless
Communications Service ("WCS") licenses to allow for "any fixed, mobile, radio location
services, or satellite Digital Audio Radio Services ('satellite DARS')" (quoting Amendment
of the Comm'n's Rules to Establish Part 27, the Wireless Comms. Serv. ("WCS"), Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21713, para. 1 (1996) (footnotes omitted)), the technical
rules adopted for WCS effectively limited terrestrial operations in this spectrum to fixed
operations. On May 20, 2010, the FCC revised the technical rules in order to "enable
licensees to provide mobile broadband services in 25 megahertz of the WCS band."
Amendment of Part 27 of the Comm'n's Rules to Govern the Operation of Wireless
Comms. Serv. in the 2.3 GHz Band, Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 82, para. 1 (2010)
[hereinafter WCS/SDARS Order].
28. Geographic Partitioning Report, supra note 9.
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rules to a wider group of licensees and permitting-under limited
conditions-leasing of spectrum among licensees.29 In addition, in 1998,
the FCC embarked on an effort to make information available about
existing spectrum licenses-essential to the functioning of efficient
markets-on its website through the Universal Licensing System
( "ULS").30
As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress amended §
336 of the Communications Act to accord licensees for Advanced
Television Services ("ATV") the right to "offer such ancillary or
supplementary services on designated frequencies as may be consistent
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity," 31 so long as the
licensee continues to broadcast at least one free standard definition, over-
the-air digital television signal.32 In 1997, the FCC defined "ancillary and
supplementary" very broadly, including "subscription television
programming, computer software distribution, data transmissions, teletext,
interactive services, audio signals, and any other services that do not
interfere with the required free service."33
These actions were the result of the emergence of a broad consensus
around basic principles of spectrum policy. By the turn of the century, it
seems clear that policymakers had embraced fully the idea that reliance on
markets and competition was preferable to regulation and administrative
process. For example, in December 1996, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt
29. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Dev. of Secondary Markets, Notice ofProposedRulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 24203 (2000); see
also Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Dev. of
Secondary Markets, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
F.C.C.R. 20604 (2003).
30. See FCC, About ULS, http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls/index.htm?job=about (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011); see also Press Release, FCC, Press Statement of FCC Chairman William E.
Kennard (Sept. 17, 1998), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
Statements/stwek870.html; see also NBP, supra note 1, at 79-80.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(2) (2006).
32. § 336(b) (2006); see also Advanced TV Sys. and Their Impact upon the Existing
TV Brdest. Serv., Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14588, para. 32 (1997) [hereinafter
Advanced TV].
33. Advanced TV, supra note 32, at para. 29. Section 336 also addressed the notion that
flexible rights result in incumbent licensees receiving a "windfall." Congress provided that
ATV licensees who use their spectrum for ancillary or supplemental services must pay a fee
to the U.S. Treasury, set to "recover for the public an amount that, to the extent feasible,
equals but does not exceed (over the term of the license) the amount that would have been
recovered" had the spectrum been auctioned. 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(2)(B) (2006) (referencing
47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2009)). In 1998, the FCC set the fee at five percent of revenues. See
Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital TV Spectrum Pursuant to Section
336(e)(1) of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259, 14 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 126 (1998).
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announced his agenda for the coming year. With respect to spectrum
policy, he said:
Spectrum should be put to its most valued use. The Commission
should trust markets to assure this result, although we should act as the
'register of deeds' for spectrum licenses-maintaining information as
to which firms hold what licenses. Auctions allow markets to
determine who will use the spectrum. We should also rely on markets
to determine how the spectrum will be used. The Commission should
move away from the old top-down, central planning approach of the
past towards a decentralized approach that allows the spectrum
licensee, 11ther than the government, to determine how spectrum will
be used."
Under Chairman Kennard, the FCC repeatedly reaffirmed its support
for a market-based approach. The Chairman's August 1999 Strategic Plan,
for example, concluded that the FCC should "[r]ely principally on the
marketplace to achieve the highest value use of spectrum." 35 Similarly, the
FCC's November 1999 Spectrum Policy Statement found that "[fllexible
allocations may result in more efficient spectrum markets . . . ."36 A
position it reiterated in its November 2000 Policy Statement on Secondary
Markets, which concluded that "[1]icensees/users should have flexibility in
determining the services to be provided and the technology used for
operation consistent with the other policies and rules governing the
service." 37
In October 2003, the FCC revised its secondary market spectrum
rules, enabling the lease of spectrum usage rights, and continuing the
FCC's "evolution toward greater reliance on the marketplace to expand the
scope of available wireless services and devices, leading to more efficient
and dynamic use of the important spectrum resource to the ultimate benefit
of consumers throughout the country."38
Other policy statements, including the 2002 Report of the FCC's
Spectrum Policy Task Force39 and NTIA's 2004 Spectrum Initiative
34. Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm'n, The Hard Road Ahead-An
Agenda for the FCC in 1997 (Dec. 26, 1996), available at http://www.fcc.
gov/Speeches/Hundt/97agenda.txt.
35. FCC, STRATEGIC PLAN: A NEW FCC FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (1999), http://
transition.fcc.gov/2 1st century/draft-strategicplan.pdf.
36. Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Dev. of Telecomms.
Techs. for the New Millennium, Policy Statement, 14 F.C.C.R. 19868, para. 9 (1999).
37. Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Dev. of
Secondary Markets, Policy Statement, 15 F.C.C.R. 24178, para. 20 (2000).
38. Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Dev.
of Secondary Markets, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
F.C.C.R. 20604, para. 2 (2003).
39. FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT 16 (2002) (hereinafter SPTF REPORT]
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report, reached similar conclusions. As discussed at length below, the
National Broadband Plan embraces-at least in the broadest sense-these
same market-oriented principles; indeed, Chairman Genachowski has made
a point of emphasizinj spectrum flexibility and secondary markets in
speeches and testimony.
To summarize, the modem consensus on spectrum reform consists of
at least the following four main elements. First, the primary goal of
spectrum policy should be to assure that spectrum is allocated to its highest
value use, defined broadly in terms of economic welfare.42 Second,
spectrum allocations and usage rights should be defined as broadly (or
"flexibly") as possible so as to allow spectrum to be "repurposed" or
"reallocated" with a minimum of administrative process. Third, market
mechanisms, including auctions (for initial assignment of licenses) and
secondary markets (for redistribution among licensees), are the preferred
method of assigning spectrum rights to parties. Fourth, and in keeping with
the principle of putting spectrum to its highest value use, government
("As a general proposition, flexibility in spectrum regulation is critical to improving access
to spectrum. In this context, 'flexibility' means granting both licensed users and unlicensed
device operators the maximum possible autonomy to determine the highest valued use of
their spectrum, subject only to those rules that are necessary to afford reasonable
opportunities for access by other spectrum users and to prevent or limit interference among
multiple spectrum uses.").
40. US DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SPECTRUM POLICY FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 21 (2006),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/implementationplan2006.pdf [hereinafter
SPECTRUM POLICY INITIATIVE PLAN] ("The FCC has adopted economic mechanisms of
various types in recent years, such as competitive bidding, increased license flexibility, and
some use of secondary markets. These tools, when applied appropriately, promote efficient
and effective allocation of spectrum.").
41. See, e.g., Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm'n, Remarks at NAB
Show 2010 (Apr. 13, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ attachmatch/DOC-
297469Al.pdf.
42. The term "economic welfare" is interchangeable with "economic efficiency." In the
context of spectrum policy, however, "efficiency" can have multiple meanings. For
example, the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force identified three definitions of efficiency,
"spectrum efficiency," "technical efficiency," and "economic efficiency," and noted that the
first two are subsumed within the third. See SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 21. ("The Task
Force identified three variations on and definitions for the term "efficiency," as applicable to
spectrum management: spectrum efficiency, technical efficiency, and economic efficiency.
Spectrum efficiency occurs when the maximum amount of information is transmitted within
the least amount of spectrum. Technical efficiency occurs when inputs, such as spectrum,
equipment, capital, and labor, are deployed in a manner that generates the most output for
the least cost. Economic efficiency occurs when all inputs are deployed in a manner that
generates the most value for consumers. The Task Force found that spectrum and technical
efficiency are components of economic efficiency, but that measuring spectrum and
technical efficiency does not necessarily provide any meaningful information with respect to
economic efficiency.").
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agencies should face incentives to use spectrum economically, and
government should release underutilized spectrum into the market.43
B. The Limits of the Modern Consensus
While the emergence of a consensus around market principles is
extremely significant, the consensus also has limits. As a result, and despite
the substantial progress detailed above, spectrum policy reform remains a
work in progress.
Implementation of the spectrum policy consensus has been slowed by
at least four factors. First, the consensus simply does not extend to some
significant policy issues, most notably the question of how much spectrum
should be "unlicensed" and hence treated as a "commons."4
Second, while most would agree with the principle of maximizing
economic welfare, significant disagreements remain over how (or even
whether) to value such "public interest" goals as public safety or
maintaining a diversity of voices on the airwaves, as well as how those
goals should be pursued.
Third, even in the significant areas where there is agreement on
principle, the agreed-upon principles do not fully address important
practical questions of implementation. What, if anything, should
government do (beyond simply creating tradable rights) to facilitate the
workings of secondary markets? To what extent does granting flexibility
generate inequitable "windfalls" for incumbents, and what is the
appropriate policy response? What is the best way to define and police
interference? How can government agencies be faced with meaningful
incentives for efficient spectrum utilization? The list, of course, goes on.
43. The consensus extends outside the United States, and several countries, including
Australia, Guatemala, and the United Kingdom, have led the United States in adopting
liberalized regimes. For a concise summary, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Property Rights and
Wireless License Values, 51 J.L. & EcoN. 563, Appendix A (2008). See also MARTIN CAVE,
REFORMING UK SPECTRUM POLICY (2002), http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/40/
mec854.htm ("For trading to bring consumer benefits, then firms must have some freedoms
to combine spectrum with other inputs in innovative ways. Ofcom will therefore need to
move further than the RA has in defining a generic set of rights and responsibilities for the
holder of a spectrum licence. Boundaries of licences will, as ever, need to be carefully
defined to help manage interference. But within such boundaries, and subject to any
international harmonization constraints, licensees should be as free as possible to determine
the wireless service they provide and the technology they choose to deploy.").
44. Even this contentious issue may be converging towards some sort of compromise.
See, e.g., Pietro Crocioni, Is Allowing Trading Enough? Making Secondary Markets in
Spectrum Work, 33 TELECOMM. POL'Y 451, 452 (2009) ("While the debate has often been
portrayed as a clash of two opposing views, in practice, there are examples where a
compromise solution has been chosen. Indeed, this has led a number of economists to take
intermediate positions where the two approaches can coexist.").
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Fourth, and finally, there is the political reality that choices about
spectrum policy inescapably involve the political distribution (or
redistribution) of wealth among competing interests. Thus, even welfare-
enhancing policy changes are subject to opposition by potential "losers,"
and even the most mundane implementation details may be controversial if
they affect the distribution of gains and losses.45
These factors have slowed the translation of the spectrum reform
consensus into actual policy. Indeed, in practice, spectrum policy has
continued for the most part to reflect the command and control legacy of
the last century. Most spectrum rights are still defined narrowly,
prescribing the technology that must be employed, the services that must be
offered, or both. 4 6 As former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt put it in 2005:
As discussed in virtually all FCC statements, but only put into practice
in certain circumstances, the FCC should not place artificial use
restrictions on the licensees. Licensees should be allowed to compete
to provide whatever service they think will serve consumers [sic]
demand providj that they do not cause undue interference to other
spectrum users.
Similarly, in 2008, Philip Weiser concluded that "the momentum of
[the spectrum reform] initiative, which built on earlier spectrum policy
reform efforts, was short lived . . .. " 48 Thus, despite the creation of limited
spectrum trading rights, billions (perhaps tens of billions) of dollars' worth
of spectrum remain locked in inefficient or obsolete uses.49 In the face of
surging demand for spectrum-based services, spectrum remains both
expensive and difficult to acquire. More than fifty years after academics
first proposed market-oriented reforms, and nearly twenty years after the
45. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 133 (1990).
46. See Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Mkt.
Allocation of Spectrum 1 (FCC OPP, Working Paper No. 38, 2002) (estimating that "only
about seven percent of the most valuable spectrum (in 300MHz - 3,000 MHz range) is
available for market allocation, i.e., is flexibly allocated and exclusively and exhaustively
licensed."). For a more recent estimate, see Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, & Vernon
Smith, Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase 30 n. 147 (Geo. Mason
L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 10-18), http://www.
law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1018RadioSpectrum20100325.pdf
(estimating less than twelve percent of U.S. spectrum under 3.5 GHz is subject to spectrum
flexibility).
47. Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Comms Policy for 2005 and Beyond 9
(Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 04-07, 2005).
48. Phillip Weiser, The Untapped Promise of Wireless Spectrum 9 (The Hamilton
Project, Discussion Paper No. 2008-08, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu
/papers/2008/07_wireless weiser.aspx.
49. Id.
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government first endorsed them, the reform agenda has been, at best, only
partially implemented.
In this context, the renewed focus on spectrum policy in the National
Broadband Plan constitutes a potentially important turning point. As the
Plan makes clear, "the failure to revisit historical allocations can leave
spectrum handcuffed to particular use cases and outmoded services, and
less valuable and less transferable to innovators who seek to use it for new
services."50 Moreover, as discussed in the following section, the costs of
such ossification increase as both the value of the spectrum and the pace of
market and technological change increase. On the surface, at least, there
seems to be good reason to believe that the pace of spectrum reform also is
poised to accelerate.
II. THE RISING COSTS OF SPECTRUM INFLEXIBILITY
As technologies advance and markets grow, the costs of command
and control regulation of spectrum grow as well. Technological progress is
constantly creating new services and increasing the efficiency with which it
is possible to provide existing ones, leading, in turn, to rapid growth in
demand for wireless services of all kinds. Spectrum is an essential input to
all wireless services, and policies that prevent that input from being used
efficiently act as an artificial restraint on both technological progress and
economic growth.
Even the partial reforms enacted since NTIA's seminal report in 1991
have generated tremendous benefits for consumers and the economy and,
equally importantly, have created powerful incentives for both market and
technological innovation. However, as much as policy has evolved,
markets and technologies have changed even more rapidly. In 1991,
virtually all wireless communications were analog. Cell phones did not
receive emails or transmit video (let alone play music or access the
nonexistent Internet); four of ten Americans still received their television
signals from terrestrial antennas;5 direct-broadcast satellite TV was just
getting off the ground; HD television (and digital radio) were still on the
drawing board; and Wi-Fi and Wi-Max were, at most, futurist dreams.
Today, new wireless technologies and applications are emerging at an ever-
increasing pace, and consumer demand for mobile broadband and other
wireless services is exploding.
50. NBP, supra note 1, at 78-79.
51. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fourth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1174 tbl. B-1 (1998)
(showing only fifty-eight percent of U.S. TV households subscribing to cable).
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The NBP bluntly acknowledges both the nature of the problem and
the urgency of reform. The Plan acknowledges that "[t]he current spectrum
policy framework"-which includes legacy command and control rules,
high transaction costs, and highly fragmented license regimes-
"sometimes impedes the free flow of spectrum to its most highly valued
uses."52 It calls for making more spectrum available, affording licensees
greater flexibility to use their spectrum, and creating new models to access
spectrum.53 Without such reforms, the Plan warns that "[t]he growth of
wireless broadband will be constrained," resulting in "higher prices, poor
service quality, an inability for the U.S. to compete internationally,
depressed demand and, ultimately, a drag on innovation." 54
The NBP is correct in its assessment that mobile wireless services
have grown rapidly in the past and are likely to continue growing in the
future, especially if, as the Plan suggests, such services come to compete
effectively with fixed broadband services for a significant proportion of the
market. 55 There is little doubt that this growth will lead to increased
spectrum requirements.56 At the same time, and as discussed further below,
the NBP itself acknowledges that spectrum demand is difficult to forecast.
What is unambiguously true, and essentially important, is that the demand
for spectrum is changing-qualitatively as well as quantitatively-at an
52. NBP, supra note 1, at 78-79.
53. See id. at 77-79, 84-94.
54. Id. at 77. These concerns echo similar warnings issued over the past two decades.
For example, the Agenda for the Future Report concluded that "[clurrent spectrum
management policies . .. are under increasing strain as the demand for existing spectrum-
based services grows, and new spectrum-related technologies and applications emerge."
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 18, at 10. Things had not changed much thirteen years
later, when the Spectrum Policy Initiative Plan (issued in June 2004) concluded that
"[c]urrent spectrum management policies are under increasing strain as the demand for
existing spectrum-based services grows and new spectrum related technologies and
applications emerge." SPECTRUM POLICY INITIATIVE PLAN, supra note 40, at 2.
55. See NBP, supra note 1, at 41 ("The ongoing upgrade of the wireless infrastructure
is promising because of its potential to be a closer competitor to wireline broadband,
especially at lower speeds.").
56. See id. at 75; see also Cisco, CISCO VIsUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE
DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE, 2010-2015 1 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.cisco.
com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/whitepaper_clI -5208
62.pdf [hereinafter CISCO FORECAST]; Comments of Alcatel-Lucent, Preserving the Open
Internet, FCC GN Dkt. No. 09-191 app. (rel. Jan. 14, 2010) (analyzing the impact of traffic
growth on the evolution of Internet access); RYSAVY RESEARCH, MOBILE BROADBAND
SPECTRUM DEMAND 3 (2008), http://www.rysavy.com/Articles/2008_1l2Rysavy
SpectrumDemand_.pdf; Comments of Verizon Wireless at 18, 73-74 n.241, 77-78,
Implementation of Sec. 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, FCC
WT Dkt. No. 09-66, (rel. Sept. 30, 2009); Comments of Verizon Wireless at 42-43, 143,
Fostering Innovation and Inv. in the Wireless Commun. Mkt., FCC GN Dkt. No. 09-157,
(rel. Sep. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Verizon Comments].
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accelerating pace. That is, spectrum demand is becoming more volatile
over time, thereby increasing the costs of a system that frustrates and
delays dynamic reallocation. As explained below, the two primary factors
behind the accelerating pace of change are: (a) the growing demand for
spectrum-based services, including mobile broadband; and (b) the rapid
pace of change in wireless (and related) technologies.
A. The Growing Demand for Wireless Services
The supply of spectrum, strictly speaking, is fixed. While technology
can (as discussed below) increase the efficiency with which spectrum is
used, and even make previously "unusable" spectrum usable, at the end of
the day there are only so many frequencies on the electromagnetic
spectrum. Furthermore, certain frequencies are, by their nature, better
suited to certain applications than others. With current technologies,
spectrum in the 300-3000 MHz range is vastly more valuable for most
applications than spectrum in either higher or lower frequencies. 57
In economic terms, spectrum "scarcity" ideally would be measured by
its price. Unfortunately, spectrum is anything but fungible. Its value
depends on a wide variety of factors, including: the size, shape, and
population characteristics (i.e., density) of the geographic area covered; the
propagation characteristics of the particular band; the interference
environment; and-in the current world of tightly-prescribed usage rights
for most spectrum licenses-the precise license conditions that determine
how the spectrum can be used. These factors make it difficult to compare
prices both across spectrum blocks (e.g., between auctions) and over time.
That said, the rapid growth of spectrum demand has consistently
outstripped both public and private projections, and there is a general
consensus that demand has increased more rapidly than supply -i.e., that
spectrum has become more, not less, scarce. 0 In absolute terms, at least,
57. See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 46.
58. See SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 12 ("Historically, both industry and
Commission projections for spectrum use have significantly and consistently
underestimated the need for additional spectrum and the public's utilization of new
technologies and applications. One illustrative example is the explosive growth in consumer
demand for mobile wireless services. In 1994, the Commission allocated spectrum based on
a projection of 54 million domestic mobile services users for the year 2000. By the year
2000, however, there actually were approximately 110 million mobile services users."). See
also J.H. Snider, An Explanation of the Citizens' Guide to the Airwaves, NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION 30 (2003), www.newamerica.net/files/airwaves.pdf ("[The d]emand for
[s]pectrum [i]s [slurging.. . . Over the last hundred years, the demand for spectrum, like the
supply of spectrum, has skyrocketed. No matter how much new supply of spectrum comes
on the market, demand seems to increase faster.").
59. See NBP, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "virtually all the major players in the
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there is no doubt that wireless spectrum continues to be expensive. For
example, in October 2007, AT&T acquired 12 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum
covering 196 million Americans (including 72 of the top 100 U.S. markets)
for $2.5 billion.60 The original bidders (including the seller, Aloha Partners,
and two firms it subsequently acquired, had purchased the spectrum in
2001 and 2003 for approximately $45 million. In early 2008, the FCC's
700 MHz auction generated $19.6 billion in revenue, nearly double prior
estimates and the highest amount for any U.S. spectrum auction.62 These
high prices are a function at least in part, of the artificial scarcity caused by
current spectrum policy.63
Looking forward, there is every reason to believe demand will
continue to grow.64 Perhaps the greatest single driver of rising spectrum
wireless industry have stated on the record that more spectrum is needed. Estimates range
from 40 to 150 megahertz per operator.") (footnotes omitted). See also SPTF REPORT,
supra note 39, at 14 ("Due to the growth in demand for spectrum-based services, many
spectrum users seek additional spectrum and it now appears as though spectrum demand is
outstripping spectrum supply.").
60. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, para. 55 (2009).
61. Aloha's spectrum was auctioned by the FCC in Auctions 44 and 49 and included
spectrum originally won in those actions by Aloha, Cavalier Group, LLC, and Datacom
Wireless, LLC, for a total of $46,668,120. See FCC, LOWER 700 MHz BAND AUCTION
ROUND RESULTS, HIGH BIDS, Auction ID: 44, (Sept. 18, 2002, 3:04 PM), http://hraunfoss
.fcc.gov/edocs jublic/attachmatch/DA-02-2323A2.pdf; FCC, LOWER 700 MHz BAND
AUCTION ROUND RESULTS, HIGH BIDS, AUCTION ID: 49 (June 16, 2003, 9:56 AM),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-03-1978A2.pdf. The latter two firms
were subsequently acquired by Aloha. Aloha Partners Expands 700 MHz Nationwide
Presence with Two Acquisitions, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
releases/aloha-partners-expands-700-mhz-nationwide-presence-with-two-acquisitions-
54014367.html (last visited November 15, 2011). At the time it was acquired, much of
Aloha's spectrum was being used by UHF television broadcasters. Moreover, Congress had
not yet set a "date certain" for the DTV transition, which required broadcasters to clear this
spectrum. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Ninth Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 20597, paras. 94-98 (2004),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-04-216Al.pdf. Thus, the relatively
low price paid by Aloha is explained to some extent by the fact that the licenses were
encumbered at the time of the 2001 and 2003 auctions and the associated uncertainty about
when the bands would be cleared. See OBI Technical Paper, supra note 3, at 25-26 ("For
example, Auctions 44, 49 and 60 of licenses in the 700 MHz band generated proceeds of
$0.03-0.05 per megahertz-pop in 2002, 2003 and 2005, respectively-low valuations driven
primarily by uncertainty over timing and cost to clear incumbent broadcast TV licensees in
that band.").
62. See Statement by Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC (March 20, 2008), http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280968Al.pdf.
63. Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 549 ("The scarcity of wireless spectrum reflects
a costly failure of regulation.").
64. See NBP, supra note 1, at 85 ("[T]he accelerating nature of industry analyst demand
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demand has come from mobile wireless radio, first through the growth of
mobile telephony and, more recently, mobile data. Figure 1 shows the
increase in the number of cell phone subscribers in the United States since
January 1985. While growth has slowed somewhat as penetration
approaches the saturation level-subscribership in the past decade grew by
"only" 239 percent, compared with 2,200 percent between 1989 and
1999-total subscribership continues to expand.
FIGURE 1:
WIRELESS SUBSCRIBERS, 1985 - 200965
Z.0 )0.000
1.0)0,000 -
,o 0,o)0 o
,.0 10,000
.,0 10.000
.0 10,000 --
voice minutes of use grew from 148 billion to 2.2 trillion, or more than
1,400 percent. In recent years, however, growth in voice traffic has slowed,
with growth averaging only about 3.5 percent annually in 2008 and 2009,
and actually declining in the last six months of 2009. 66
forecasts makes clear that it is not a question of if the U.S. will require 300 megahertz of
spectrum for mobile broadband, but when.").
65. ROBERT F. ROCHE & LESLEY O'NEILL, CTIA's WIRELESS INDUSTRY INDICES: SEMI-
ANNUAL DATA SURVEY RESULTS: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM CTIA ANALYZING THE
U.S. WIRELESS INDUSTRY 21 (2010) [hereinafter CTIA SURVEY].
66. Id. at 197-98.
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The leveling out of voice usage has been more than matched by
increased data usage, including text (SMS) and multimedia (MMS)
messaging. As shown in Figure 2 below, the volume of SMS messages rose
from 25 billion in the second half of 2004 to 823 billion in the second half
of 2009, an increase of 3,100 percent-not including an additional 24
billion MMS messages.
FIGURE 2:
WIRELESS MOUS AND MESSAGES
(SEMI-ANNUAL VOLUMES, JUNE 2005-JUNE 2009)67
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Looking ahead, analysts expect mobile data traffic to continue
growing. Overall, "mobile data traffic increased 160 percent from calendar
year-end 2008 to calendar year-end 2009,"68 and Cisco projects that mobile
data traffic will double every year through 2014 at a compound annual
growth rate ("CAGR") of 108 percent, as depicted in Figure 3.
67. Id. at 213.
68. Cisco FORECAST, supra note 56, at 1.
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FIGURE 3:
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Growing demand for spectrum is not limited to mobile broadband, or
even to the private sector. For example, Congress has recognized public
safety's spectrum needs by dedicating 24 MHz of the 700 MHz band for
public safety purposes.70 The FCC allocated an additional 50 MHz in the
4.9 GHz band, as well as reconfiguring the 800 MHz band to eliminate
interference to public safety and provide more efficient spectrum
assignments.71
One unsurprising result of increasing spectrum demand is to raise the
economic welfare costs of inflexibility, as illustrated in Figure 4 below.
The Figure shows two supply curves, SF and Sc, where SF represents the
supply of spectrum in a world with full spectrum flexibility while Sc
represents supply when spectrum flexibility is constrained. While the two
curves intersect near the origin, they grow further apart as quantity
69. Id. at 2; see also Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association at 3-4, A National
Broadband Plan for our Future, FCC GN Dkt. No. 09-51 (rel. Oct. 23, 2009).
70. See generally Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety
Network in the 700 MHz Band; Dev. of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements
for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Commun. Requirements Through the
Year 2010, Ninth Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 14837 (2006).
71. Id.
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increases-representing the fact that, over any particular period of time, the
supply response to increased demand will be greater under spectrum
flexibility than when flexibility is constrained. (In economic terms, the two
curves depict the fact that supply is, by definition, more "elastic" under
flexibility.) When growth in demand is relatively small (e.g., from Do to
DI), the welfare loss resulting from constrained suppl is also relatively
small, as indicated by the smaller, dark-shaded triangle.
The effect of inflexibility at higher levels of demand growth is shown
by the effects of shifting demand to D2, and the welfare loss associated with
inflexibility in this larger market is shown by the larger, "two-toned"
triangle-the darker portion of which shows the welfare loss in the less
dynamic market, with the lighter portion representing the increased welfare
loss as the market grows.
FIGURE 4:
IMPACT OF GROWING SPECTRUM DEMAND ON
WELFARE LOSSES FROM INFLEXIBILITY
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72. Under full flexibility, the price would be P1" and quantity would be Q, . Under
constrained flexibility, price is higher at PIC and quantity is lower at Qc. The dark-shaded
triangle represents the lost consumer and producer surplus (the area below the demand curve
and above the supply curve) as a result of constrained flexibility.
D
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The upshot is straightforward: whatever the costs have been in the
past of keeping spectrum locked up in inefficient uses, those costs will
grow as the demand for spectrum increases. That is, the costs of spectrum
inflexibility are both high and rising.
B. The Effects of Innovation and Market Dynamism
While the development of new technologies has increased the value of
wireless communications services and hence increased the demand for
spectrum, technology is also making it possible to use spectrum more
efficiently. This allows more information to be transmitted over the same
amount of spectrum, or even allows spectrum previously thought to be
"unusable" to be put to productive use.73
Resources expended in pursuit of more efficient spectrum use,
whether in the form of research and development or deployment of more
spectrum-efficient infrastructures, are not free. Thus, to the extent
government policies have the effect of creating artificial scarcity, the
market response is to overinvest in spectrum efficiency-i.e., to devote
resources to economizing on spectrum which could better be devoted to
creating new products and services, or to lowering prices. At the same time,
however, government policies can inefficiently retard the development of
new technologies, for example by locking spectrum licensees into
inefficient technologies, failing to provide incentives for least-cost
solutions to spectrum interference problems, or imposing delays and higher
costs on new entrants.
Based on my analysis, I believe technological advances that increase
the effective supply of spectrum fall generally into four categories:
spectrum reuse, e.g., through the use of ever smaller cell sizes; the ability to
use higher bands (shorter wavelengths), thus expanding the range of usable
spectrum; use of improved hardware and software (e.g., digital signal
73. As discussed further below, advances in radio communications technology
generally, and in spread spectrum and cognitive (or "smart") radio technologies in
particular, have led some academics to argue that the "era of spectrum scarcity is at an end."
See, e.g., Michael Calabrese, The End of Spectrum 'Scarcity': Building on the TV Bands
Database to Access Unused Public Airwaves, New America Foundation, Working Paper
No. 25, 2009), http://www.newamerica.net/files/CalabreseWorkingPaper25_End
SpectrumScarcity.pdf. Such predictions may (or may not) prove accurate-at some point in
the unforeseeable future. The available evidence is that technology can contribute
dramatically to spectrum efficiency (just as more fuel efficient cars can contribute to
reducing energy use), but not replace the need for policies that provide incentives for
efficient spectrum use, i.e., for further implementation of market-oriented reforms. The
question, after all, is not whether new technologies should be put to work to increase the
effective supply of spectrum, but how. Advances in technology clearly have the potential to
increase the efficiency with which spectrum is used, and policies need to be put in place to
allow (and provide the proper incentives) for these efficiencies to be realized.
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processing) to carry more data within a given spectrum block; and use of
spread spectrum, software defined radio ("SDR") and cognitive (or
"smart") radio technologies to permit multiple users to operate within a
given block of spectrum without causing harmful interference.
First, perhaps the most important innovation for purposes of overall
spectral efficiency has been the rapid advance in cellular technology that
has made possible dramatically higher rates of spectrum efficiency through,
for example, more intensive frequency reuse, improved directional antenna
technologies, and increased use of cell splitting, thus dramatically
increasin4 the capacity of these systems for any given amount of
spectrum.
Second, technological progress has made it possible to utilize ever
higher bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. Since the 1920s, when it was
thought the usable spectrum extended only to 3 MHz, technology has now
progressed to the point where communications are possible in bands as
high as 300 GHz, and the FCC has licensed spectrum in bands as high as
95 GHz band for a variety of applications, including point-to-point and
point-to-multipoint broadband communications.76 Even with better
technology, however, very high frequency spectrum is useful for only
limited applications, due to the inability of high frequency transmissions to
penetrate buildings (or even clouds), and other propagation characteristics.
Third, advances in hardware and software, such as more
discriminating antennas and digital signal processing algorithms, can
increase the data rate or throughput of a given service or device within a
given block of spectrum. Digital technologies allow for the use of digital
signal processing and other techniques, which can effectively increase the
signal-to-noise ratio for any given transmission and thus result in more
efficient spectrum use. This increases, for example, the channel capacity
of direct broadcast satellite television while simultaneously improving
signal quality; dramatically improving the spectral efficiency of
74. See, e.g., Verizon Comments, supra note 56, at 94-96.
75. See Wireless Craze, supra note 25, at 35-39.
76. See Allocations and Service Rules for the 71-76 GHz, 81-86 GHz and 92-95 GHz
Bands, Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 12182 (2002).
77. See SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 14.
78. See, e.g., Joslyn Read, Commercial Users, Address at Improving Spectrum
Management through Economic or Other Incentives: A Workshop 167 (Mar. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/spectrumworkshop-030106.pdf
For a summary of recent advances in DBS technologies, see Testimony Before the Comm.
on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Commun., Tech. and the Internet U.S. HR.:
Hearing on the National Broadband Plan: Deploying Quality Broadband Services to the
Last Mile, 11I 1h Cong. (2010) (Statement of Mark Dankberg, Chairman and CEO, ViaSat,
Inc., http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/2010042 1/Dankberg
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television broadcasting; and, as shown in Figure 5 below, increasing by a
factor of forty or more the spectral efficiency of mobile data standards in
approximately a decade.79
FIGURE 5:
SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY OF SUCCESSIVE MOBILE DATA
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Fourth, and relatedly, spread spectrum and smart radio technologies
can-at least in principle-allow multiple signals to use the same blocks of
spectrum simultaneously without causing harmful interference. Spread
spectrum technology is not new; indeed, the idea dates to patents filed by
Nicola Tesla in 1900, and primitive spread spectrum systems have been in
use since at least World War II. More recent uses include cordless home
telephone systems, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and Wi-Max. While spread spectrum
systems are often associated with "unlicensed" spectrum (e.g., Wi-Fi),
these technologies have seen their most widespread deployment in CDMA
2G and 3G mobile wireless networks.82
.Test imony.04.21.2010.pdf.
79. NBP, supra note 1, at 41.
80. Id. exhibit 4-F.
81. See id. at 95 ("Public comment has suggested that 'opportunistic' or 'cognitive'
technologies can significantly increase the efficiency of spectrum utilization by enabling
radios to access and share available spectrum dynamically. These technologies could allow
access to many different frequencies across the spectrum chart that may not be in use at a
specific place and time and could do so without harming other users' operations or interests.
Given the upside potential of these technologies, the FCC and NTIA should take steps to
expand the environment in which new, opportunistic technologies can be developed and
improved.") (citations omitted).
82. See Verizon Comments, supra note 56, at 95 n.277.
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Technological advances have now made it possible for such systems
to provide a broader range of services. Using mesh networks, Wi-Fi
technology is already capable of providing area-wide coverage for
broadband services; and Wi-Max technology, which functions over far
greater ranges than Wi-Fi, can provide not only fixed broadband
connections but mobile broadband services as well. Further technological
progress in these areas seems highly likely.
Cognitive and software-defined radio technologies (sometimes called
"agile" radios) allow transmitters to identify, in real time, unused portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum and to target their transmissions to use
only those unoccupied bands. Thus, for example, it is theoretically possible
for cognitive radios to operate in the unused "white spaces" that exist either
in the form of time (i.e., when a block of spectrum is used only
intermittently) or geography (e.g., in the gaps between geographic areas
that are used by-as opposed to allocated to-television broadcasters),
without causing interference.
The theoretical promise of such applications has yet to be
convincingly demonstrated in practice. Tests by the FCC of radios designed
to utilize the so-called TV white spaces, for example, showed that the
radios were not able to sense television transmissions with sufficient
precision and certainty to avoid interference signals, even under "test-bed"
conditions.83 If such devices were deployed in "mass market" numbers, the
problem becomes more complex, since their cumulative emissions might
lead to interference, even if one or a few devices did not.84 Moreover, there
are some basic problems-such as when a "smart" radio is blocked by a
building or other obstacle from sensing an interfering signal, and falsely
concludes it is safe to transmit-which are not amenable to obvious
solutions. Thus, it remains unclear when or whether such smart radios will
become commercially practical, or for what applications.8 5
83. See STEVEN K. JONES & THOMAS W. PHILLIPS, INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE
PERFORMANCE OF PROTOTYPE TV-BAND WHITE SPACE DEVICES (FCC 2007).
84. See SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 26 ("Although the energy radiated by a single
emitter might not be likely to cause harm, the cumulative emissions of secondary/unlicensed
emitters and out-of-band emissions of primary licensed emitters and emitter types (radio
telemetry, unlicensed devices, cell phones, etc.) could result in interference and, thus, must
be considered. Technological changes in a communications system - for example, the type
of waveform used to transmit a particular signal - also affect assessments of interference.").
See also Steve Sharkey, Commercial Users, Address at Improving Spectrum Management
through Economic or Other Incentives: A Workshop 172, 176 (Mar. 1, 2006), http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/spectrumworkshop_030106.pdf.
85. On September 23, 2010, the FCC issued further regulations for the use of "smart
radios" in the TV white spaces. Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 18661 (2010). The FCC's Order included
removing the requirement that white space devices contain interference-sensing technology,
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The advent of spectrum sharing technologies has led to intense debate
about how such technologies should be implemented. Advocates of market-
oriented reform have argued that the property-rights approach they have
advocated for many years can fully accommodate these new approaches,
and indeed, will provide the proper incentives for their rapid introduction.86
Others suggest that the property-rights model cannot accommodate
spectrum sharing, and propose expanded use of spectrum "commons," in
which spectrum is not licensed at all, and the use of "easements" (or
"underlay rights") permitting use of such technologies even in blocks
currently licensed for exclusive use.87
From the perspective of the spectrum reallocation debate, the facts
above have two primary implications. First, technological progress has
significantly improved spectrum efficiency, and likely will continue to do
so. However, the rate of such progress is inherently difficult to predict. As
noted above, some observers have gone so far as to predict "the end of
scarcity." For example, an NTIA advisory panel opined in a May 2010
report:
The communications industry is beginning the implementation of a
new generation of cellular technology that incorporates smart antennas,
Internet protocol, and other new techniques for content compression.
Over the next 10 to 20 years, these new technologies will effectively
multiply existing cellular-communications spectrum allocations by at
least an additional 10 times. This is the equivalent o finding an
additional 2500 MHz of spectrum for mobile wireless use.
Conversely, many observers believe that, while there may be some
additional efficiencies still to be captured by further implementation of
technologies such as smart antennas, technology is approaching the
theoretical physical limit of the amount of information capable of being
carried over a wireless signal.89
allowing them instead to rely on online databases.
86. See, e.g., THOMAS M. LENARD ET AL., DIGITAL AGE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REPORT
FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON NEW SPECTRUM POLICY (The Progress & Freedom
Foundation, Mar. 2006) [hereinafter DACA REPORT].
87. See id.
88. MICHAEL CALABRESE ET AL., REPORT FROM THE SPECTRUM INVENTORY WORKING
GROUP OF THE COMMERCE SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 4 (2010)
[hereinafter SIWG REPORT].
89. The theoretical limit is defined by Shannon's Law (sometimes called the Shannon-
Hartley Theorem), which states that the maximum amount of information that a channel can
carry depends upon its bandwidth and the strength of the desired signal relative to the
strength of the noise in the channel. See MARK MACCARTHY, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE,
RETHINKING SPECTRUM POLICY: A FIBER INTENSIVE WIRELESS ARCHITECTURE, 10 (2010)
("One participant observed that further improvements in spectral efficiency cannot be
expected to continue indefinitely, noting that the efficiency of 4G service is approaching 75
percent of the Shannon's law limit. Other participants agreed, noting that some increases in
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A second and related point is that technological change-in devices
and services as well as in wireless technology itself-is driving changes in
the marketplace which are also inherently unpredictable, and thus increase
the importance of allowing spectrum to flow dynamically away from old
uses into new uses.90 In such an environment, it is common for services
once regarded as promising (e.g., MSS) to fail in the marketplace (at least
as originally envisioned), while demand suddenly emerges for new services
(e.g., mobile TV) once regarded as unlikely to succeed.91 The ability of
spectrum to flow from market and technological "losers" to "winners" is
essential, and-as the NBP seems to recognize-the only way for such
transitions to occur in real time is through flexible licenses and effective
secondary markets.
IV. THE CHOICES AHEAD
The NBP places heavy emphasis on the importance of spectrum
policy, not just for communications but for the U.S. economy overall.92 it
advances an aggressive reform agenda, including proposals to create new
tools for spectrum repurposing, facilitate the workings of secondary
markets, develop new incentives for privatization of spectrum licensed or
assigned to government, and increase reliance on unlicensed spectrum.
Most famously, it calls for reallocating 500 MHz of spectrum to mobile
broadband use within the next decade, at least in part through the use of
voluntary incentive auctions. 93
The extent to which the NBP's proposals ultimately comport with the
spectrum policy consensus will depend on the outcomes of multiple
rulemakings and, to some extent, on how Congress responds to the Plan's
calls for statutory change.94 A preliminary assessment gives cause for both
efficiency were likely to continue, but that alone they would not enable channel capacity to
increase enough to meet projected demand for wireless services."). See also Claude E.
Shannon, Communication in the Presence of Noise, 37 PROC. OF THE IRE 10 (Jan. 1949),
reprinted in 86 PROC. OF THE IEEE 447 (Feb. 1998), http://www.stanford.edu/class/
eeI04/shannonpaper.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Everett M. Ehrlich et al., The Impact of Regulation on Innovation and
Choice in Wireless Communications, 9 REV. OF NETWORK EcON. 1, 19-21 (2010); see also
Robert Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the
Government Should Do to Promote its Successor, 8 J. ON TELECOMMS. AND HIGH TECH. L.
313 (2010) [hereinafter Ehrlich].
91. Lauren Goode & Amy Schatz, Mobile TV Gets Closer as Backers Cut a Path,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,2010, at Bl.
92. NBP, supra note 1, at 75 ("Spectrum policy must be a key pillar of U.S. economic
policy.").
93. Id. at xii.
94. Legislation to authorize the FCC's proposed "incentive auction" approach to
reallocation has been introduced in the Senate by Sen. Rockefeller, S. 3756, 111th Cong.
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hope and concern. On the one hand, the Plan emphasizes the importance of
spectrum flexibility and secondary markets, calls for reliance on market
incentives, and advances important principles for how to incentivize
reallocation of both government and commercial spectrum.95 On the other
hand, the Plan also envisions an active government role in repurposing
privately held spectrum,96 and its proposals for freeing up additional
government-encumbered spectrum may well (like past efforts) prove
ineffectual. Moreover, the plan endorses several other policies, such as
spectrum fees and build-out requirements that are at variance with the
market-oriented consensus.
The discussion below begins with a detailed assessment of the NBP's
proposal to reallocate 500 MHz of spectrum from alternative uses to mobile
broadband, primarily through the use of incentive auctions and voluntary,
market-oriented mechanisms. It next turns to the Plan's proposals for
identifying and privatizing spectrum currently allocated to government use.
The third section briefly addresses some of the Plan's other conclusions,
such as its embrace of spectrum fees and build-out requirements, and
places its recommendations in the context of other contemporaneous FCC
actions (such as the Skyterra Order), which together seem to conflict with
its overall market-oriented approach. The ultimate conclusion is that, while
the NBP has the potential to accelerate the pace of market-oriented
spectrum reform, it includes some proposals that could frustrate the
achievement of that objective.
A. Repurposing Commercial Spectrum: Flexible Rights and
Secondary Markets vs. Administrative Reallocation
The core of the modem spectrum reform consensus is that markets
will do a better job of moving privately-held s ectrum from lower- to
higher-value uses than administrative processes. As discussed above,
(2010); and in the House by Rep. Boucher, H.R. 5947, 111th Cong. (2010).
95. NBP, supra note 1, at 73.
96. Id. at 81. As explained below, the NBP proposes that the FCC act as a "third party
auctioneer" in its proposed incentive auction plan.
97. See, e.g., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13; see also Robert
Crandall et al., Privatizing the Electromagnetic Spectrum, FuTuRE INSIGHT 3.1, Apr. 1996,
at 1; see also Michael H. Rothkopf & Coleman Bazelon, Interlicense Competition:
Spectrum Deregulation Without Confiscation or Giveaways 1-2 (New America Foundation,
Spectrum Series Working Paper No. 8, 2003), http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/
2003/182/RothkopfBazelon.pdf. ("Economic efficiency suggests that existing license
rights should be expanded to give users the flexibility to redeploy spectrum to its most
valuable use and to trade licenses or unused capacity on secondary markets . . . . There is a
general consensus at the FCC and among policy experts that the commercial use of
spectrum should be largely deregulated, giving users far greater flexibility to determine the
113Number 1]
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there is widespread agreement that past efforts to repurpose spectrum
through administrative processes have been inefficient, in part because the
government is not well positioned to predict technological and market
trends that affect spectrum demand, and in part because, even when such
trends become self-evident, government is too slow in reacting to them.
Hence, it is widely agreed that a market-oriented approach based on
voluntary exchange would be superior.
There is widespread agreement that the task of actually creating
workable spectrum markets is a difficult one. Ultimately, that task can be
broken into two parts: (1) defining flexible rights; and (2) developing
markets in which those rights can be traded. There is virtually universal
agreement that the first task, defining property rights, falls clearly within
the realm of government. In calling for more spectrum to be made available
for broadband services, the NBP appropriately recommends that this new
spectrum should be afforded greater flexibility in how it can be
employed. Although it also clearly states that licensees be allowed to
freely trade their spectrum in the secondary market,99 there is somewhat
less agreement about the extent to which government should involve itself
in the facilitation or creation of such secondary markets. Indeed, the NBP
indicates a lack of confidence in the ability of secondary markets alone to
repurpose spectrum currently subject to command-and-control regulation to
new applications governed by flexible rights and market-oriented policies.
Thus, while the NBP adopts many of the concepts of the modern
reform consensus, it also embraces (with qualifications) an outcomes-based
approach premised on government's continued involvement in repurposing
spectrum. In short, as explained below, the NBP neither clearly embraces
nor clearly rejects the spectrum reform consensus. The proof, therefore,
will come in decisions the FCC will make in the years ahead.
1. Costs and Delays of Administrative Reallocation
As noted above, one area where the NBP is in complete accord with
the reform consensus is with respect to the long and costly lags associated
with traditional, command and control repurposing. Spectrum reform
advocates have long pointed to the lengthy delays associated with
repurposing as a primary reason for moving to a market-oriented system of
flexibility and secondary markets.100 For example, FiberTower, a provider
service provided on a band, or even to sell or sublease access to other firms through
secondary market transactions.").
98. See NBP, supra note 1, at 78-79.
99. Id. at 83.
100. See, e.g., DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 1 ("The costs associated with
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of wireless point-to-point backhaul services, filed a petition with the FCC
in July 2004 to permit the use of smaller antennas in the 11 GHz band,
which is also used for international satellite services.101 The FCC finally
approved the proposal more than three years later, in September 2007.102
In January 2005, Qualcomm petitioned the FCC for guidance on the
interference rules that would apply to its intention to offer mobile video
services in the 700 MHz band using its MediaFlo technology.10 3 The FCC
took more than twenty months to rule on the petition, finally issuing a
Report and Order in October 2006.104
In 2006, the FCC auctioned off spectrum in the 1710-1755 MHz and
2110-2155 MHz bands for advanced wireless services ("AWS"), based on
an agreement with federal agencies to vacate the spectrum. os Three years
later, much of the spectrum had yet to be clearedl06 and the winning
bidders in the AWS auction were not yet able to make full use of the
spectrum. 107
In March 2008, after many years of delay, the FCC auctioned
spectrum in the 700 MHz block, which had previously been allocated to
analog television. os While the FCC successfully auctioned over 1,000
inefficient utilization of the spectrum under this 'command-and-control' system have
become enormous . . .. Although it is difficult to quantify all of the costs associated with the
current regime- especially the costs of innovations foregone or delayed-studies suggest
that they could be in the tens of billions of dollars annually or even more.").
101. See Petition for Rulemaking, Amendment of Part 101 of the Comm'n's Rules to
Increase Spectrum Use Through More Flexible Antenna Rules for the 10.7-11.7 GHz Band,
FCC RM Docket No. 11043 (rel. May 26, 2004), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6516285211.
102. See Amendment of Part 101 of the Comm'n's Rules to Modify Antenna
Requirements for the 10.7-11.7 GHz Band, Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 17153 (2007)
[hereinafter Antenna Requirements Report and Order].
103. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling, QUALCOMM Incorporated Petition for
Declaratory Ruling that OET-69 is Acceptable to Demonstrate Compliance with Section
27.60, FCC WT Docket No. 05-7 (rel., Jan. 14, 2005), available at
http://fallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6516890210.
104. Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 566.
105. See Fact Sheet, FCC, Auction 66: Advanced Wireless Service (AWS-1) (Apr. 27,
2009), http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction-factsheet&id=66.
106. But see Applications of Cellco Partnerships, Verizon Wireless & Atlantis Holdings
LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, 23 F.C.C.R. 17444, para.
66 (2008) [hereinafter Verizon-Alltel Order].
107. See 1710-1755 MHz Introduction, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (last visited Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/2011/1710-1755-
mhz-introduction (providing links to information on the 1710-1755 MHz relocation); see
also NTIA, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, RELOCATION OF FEDERAL RADIO SYSTEMS FROM THE
1710-1755 MHz SPECTRUM BAND: SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT (2009), http://www.
ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/final2ndannualrelocationreport2009o4l6. pdf.
108. See Fact Sheet, FCC, Auction 73: 700 MHz Band, (Feb. 10, 2009),
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 115 2011-2012
116 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL [Vol.64
licenses, bids for the "D-Block" license, which was encumbered with
public safety requirements, did not meet the reserve price.109 Two months
later, in May 2008, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
proposing a new regime, but despite a commitment in the NBP that the
FCC would issue new order in 2010, but action is still pending more than
two years later. o10 In August 2010, Senator Rockefeller introduced
legislation to reallocate the spectrum from commercial to public safety use
and to use the proceeds from incentive auctions to provide funding to
support an interoperable public safety network.1I
Such delays directly harm consumers. For example, as a result of the
delay in clearing the AWS spectrum, T-Mobile (which paid over $4 billion)
was forced to delay plans to deploy mobile broadband services in
competition with AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon. 112
The NBP fully embraces these concerns, presenting a summary of
recent spectrum repurposing proceedings in Figure 6, which demonstrate
the long delays associated with administrative reallocation. As the FCC
notes, "[t]he process of revisitin or revising spectrum allocations has
historically taken 6-13 years . . . . 3
FIGURE 6:
TIME REQUIRED TO REALLOCATE SPECTRUM THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS114
Band First Step Avaiae for Use Approximate Time Lag
Cellular (Advanced Mobile Phone System) 1970 1981 11 years
PCS 1989 1995 6 years
Educational Broadband Service 1996 2006 10 years
(EBS)/Broadband Radio Service (8RS)
700 MHz 1996 2009 13 years
AWS-1 2000 2006 6 years
Thus, the NBP seems to be fully in accord with the modern consensus
that administrative reallocation is a long and cumbersome process.
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction-factsheet&id=66.
109. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185 (2009).
110. See NBP, supra note 1, at 84 (providing that the FCC confirmed its intention to
issue a new D-Block Order in 2010).
111. S.3756, 111th Cong. (2010).
112. Comments of T-Mobile USA, Inc., Relocation of Federal Systems in the 1710-
1755 MHz Frequency Band: Review of the Initial Implementation of the Commercial
Spectrum Enhancement Act, FCC Docket No. 0906231085-91085-01 (rel. Aug. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter T-Mobile Aug. 2009 Comments].
113. NBP, supra note 1, at 79.
114. Id.
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2. Creating Incentives for Incumbent Licensees to Vacate
Underutilized Spectrum
A second area where the NBP and the modem consensus are in at
least partial accord is with respect to the benefits of providing incentives
for incumbents to reallocate their spectrum. From the perspective of the
modem consensus, allowing license holders to share in the value creation
associated with spectrum reallocation goes hand in hand with the concept
of spectrum flexibility and tradable rights, the very purpose of which is to
provide incentives for licensees to increase the value associated with their
spectrum, or to lease or sell it to someone who can. The political
perception, however, has been that such gains constitute inequitable
windfalls, which should be taxed away, or not permitted at all. 116
Spectrum reform proponents have responded to the "windfall"
argument in a variety of ways, including noting that virtually all current
spectrum licensees paid for their spectrum,1 17 that increases in the value of
the spectrum resulting from private investment properly belong to those
making the investments," 8 that windfalls are inherent in many beneficial
government activities (e.g., building interstate highways benefits those who
own land nearby), and that, in any case, the broad-based application of
spectrum flexibility would dramatically increase the supply of spectrum in
the market, and thus limit or even potentially eliminate any windfalls.'1
115. See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 6 n.5 ("The license
flexibility advocated throughout this filing may appear to be a 'windfall' for incumbents, as
operators are permitted to use spectrum more productively. However, a general FCC policy
permitting greater flexibility will simultaneously reduce license values by introducing
increased competitiveness. Net 'windfalls' may be positive or negative, and will vary case
by case. What is clear, however, is that more efficient use of spectrum will benefit
consumers. Efforts to extract gains from licensees (or compensate for losses) should not be
permitted unduly to hinder or delay realization of the public benefits from promoting greater
competitiveness through spectrum liberalization.").
116. See, e.g., DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 19 ("[Granting flexibility to
incumbents] entails the perception of large giveaways that are likely to be unacceptable to
many people. Giving the current incumbents increased flexibility would increase efficiency,
but the reality is that there would be winners and losers, which would also be perceived as
unfair and would likely lead to substantial litigation, delaying the transition to a market-
driven regime."). See also J.H. Snider, The Art of Spectrum Lobbying: America's $480
Billion Spectrum Giveaway, How it Happened, and How to Prevent it from Recurring, (New
America Foundation, Working Paper No. 19, 2007).
117. For example, virtually all broadcast stations have changed hands at least once since
originally receiving their broadcast licenses, and the implicit value of the spectrum was
incorporated in the sale price of the station at the time of sale.
118. See AYN RAND, THE PROPERTY STATUS OF AIRWAVES (1996), reprinted from AYN
RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL (New American Library ed., 1964).
119. See Property Rights, supra note 43, at 565 ("[L]icenses issued by countries
awarding substantially more extensive property rights are less valuable than other licenses.
117Number 1]
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Most importantly, it is noted, letting incumbents profit from reallocation is
what makes flexibility work: it creates the incentive for change, which is
the whole idea.
As discussed further below, the question of how gains from flexibility
can be shared between the incumbent and the government is closely related
to the precise nature of the flexibility granted and the mechanism by which
reallocation is proposed to occur. The simplest option is to grant licensees
flexibility and, if government feels the need to expropriate some of the
resulting gains, to impose a tax or fee. Indeed, as noted above, this is what
Congress did in amending Section 336 of the Communications Act
(permitting partial flexibility for the ATV spectrum but requiring the FCC
to establish a fee on ancillary or supplementary services). Another
option involves auctioning "overlay" rights, which give entrants exclusive
rights to negotiate with incumbents, who continue to have at least some
rights to demand compensation as a condition of vacating their spectrum.
Yet another approach to incentivizing reallocation is to offer
incumbents some combination of carrots and sticks designed to encourage
them to agree "voluntarily" to put their spectrum up for sale in a
government-run auction. The proposed carrots typically include some share
of the auction proceeds, while the sticks may include the offering (or
withholding) of a variety of regulatory benefits such as, in the case of
broadcasters, continued must-carry rights. 12 ' The NBP adopts this carrot
and stick approach in the form of "incentive auctions":
Given the practical challenges of reallocation, the FCC needs to create
new incentives for incumbent licensees to yield to next-generation
users . . . . Contentious spectrum proceedings can be time-consuming,
sometimes taking many years to resolve, and incurring significant
opportunity costs. One way to address this challenge is by motivating
The difference is large-about 61 percent. These findings offer important evidence as to the
direction of windfalls associated with far-reaching liberalization of radio spectrum rights.").
120. 47 U.S.C. § 336 (2006); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
121. See Weiser, supra note 48, at 20 ("To facilitate win-win trades between UHF TV
broadcasters and other higher-value uses of spectrum (such as wireless broadband
providers), I recommend a two-part program. First, such trades should be facilitated through
a government-managed auction process, and subject to some form of a windfall tax. From a
policy perspective, the most critical aspect of this tax is that it should be high enough to
address the concern of unfair windfalls, but not too high such that it renders unprofitable or
undesirable sales of UHF TV spectrum licenses. Second, as an incentive to make such
trades, the UHF broadcaster should also be afforded the opportunity to exercise its must-
carry right for some continuing period after it sold its right to use the radio spectrum (and
thus be able to demonstrate the value of its content for purposes of a commercial carriage
agreement with the relevant cable and satellite providers). This transitional right to have
programs carried on cable and satellite platforms would create a powerful incentive for
stations with limited over-the-air viewership to consider selling their underlying
transmission rights."). See also Kwerel & Williams, supra note 46, at iv.
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existing licensees to voluntarily clear spectrum through incentive
auctions.122
As discussed further below, such auctions are roposed as a
mechanism for reallocating both ATV and MSS spectrum. On July 15,
2010, the FCC adopted a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of
inquiry to remove regulatory barriers to terrestrial use of MSS spectrum in
the 2 GHz, Big LEO, and L-band frequencies.124 The notice of inquiry
seeks comment on whether "voluntary incentive auctions" would be "an
appropriate mechanism for providing an option for incumbent 2 GHz MSS
licensees to vacate the band in favor of mobile broadband providers
operating on new licenses[.]" 1 25
As the NBP notes, the FCC's ability to share the proceeds of auctions
with current licensees would require Congressional approval-a fact which
perhaps explains, at least in part, why the NBP emphasizes that:
[ajlthough sharing auction proceeds through incentive auctions means
that some funds paid for spectrum will not go to the U.S. Treasury,
incentive auctions should have a net-positive revenue impact for a
variety of reasons: accelerated clearing, more certainty about costs, and
the ability to auction a cent spectrum that, due to technical rules, is
not currently licensed."
3. Facilitating (or Operating) Secondary Markets
The question of how much government can or should do to facilitate
the development of secondary markets is a subject of continuing debate
among economists and policymakers. Some economists argue that
secondary markets can function effectively with a minimum of government
involvement or, indeed, that they already are.127 Others take the view that
122. NBP, supra note 1, at 81. See also Genachowski, supra note 41, at 5 ("[The NBP]
proposes voluntary incentive auctions-a process for sharing with broadcasters a
meaningful part of the billions of dollars of value that would be unlocked if some broadcast
spectrum was converted to mobile broadband.") (emphasis added).
123. See NBP, supra note 1, at 88 ("Exercise of this option [granting terrestrial rights to
MSS licensees] should be conditioned on construction benchmarks, participation in an
incentive auction, or other conditions designed to ensure timely utilization of the spectrum
for broadband and appropriate consideration for the step-up in the value of the affected
spectrum.") (emphasis added).
124. See Fixed and Mobile Servs. in the Mobile Satellite Serv. Bands at 1525-1559
MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5-2483.5-2500 MHz and 2000-2020 MHz and
2180-2200 MHz, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R 9461
(2010) [hereinafter Fixed and Mobile Servs.].
125. Id. at para. 28.
126. NBP, supra note 1, at 82 (citation omitted).
127. John W. Mayo & Scott Wallsten, Enabling Efficient Wireless Communications: The
Role ofSecondary Spectrum Markets, 22 INFO EcoN. & POLICY 61, 62 (2010).
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various market imperfections require more active government
participation.128 The NBP comes down firmly in favor of the latter view.129
As a preliminary matter, there is a broad-based consensus on at least a
de minimis government role as a provider of accurate information about
spectrum licenses. 130 As noted above, this consensus led, in the late 1990s,
to the development of the Universal Licensing System, which makes
available information about the identity of spectrum licensees as well as
rudimentary information about the characteristics of the licenses
themselves (e.g., market areas, permitted services). Simultaneous with the
release of the National Broadband Plan, on March 17, 2010, the FCC
announced the launch of a new "Spectrum Dashboard," which provides
enhanced search and mapping capabilities and an improved user
interface.131 Further, Congress is considering legislation (S.649, introduced
March 19, 2009 and H.R. 3125 introduced on July 8, 2009, and passed by
the House on April 13, 2010)12 which would mandate a jointly managed
FCC-NTIA "spectrum inventory" of both commercial and government
spectrum. The NBP endorses continuing efforts to improve the availability
of information about spectrum licenses in order to promote the functioning
of secondary markets.
128. See, e.g., Kwerel & Williams, supra note 46.
129. NBP, supra note 1, at 81-82.
130. See, e.g., DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 11-12.
131. Press Release, FCC, Commission Announces "Beta" Launch of Spectrum
Dashboard (Mar. 17, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs jublic/attachmatch /DOC-
296942Al.pdf. See also Spectrum Dashboard, FCC, http://reboot.fcc.gov/reform/sys
tems/spectrum-dashboard (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
132. See generally H.R. REP. No. 111-462 (2010), http://frwebgate.access. gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 11 congreports&docid=f:hr 462.111 .pdf.
133. See NBP, supra note 1, at 80-81. The NBP also endorses additional efforts to
measure spectrum use (i.e., the extent to which spectrum license holders are actually using
the spectrum rights they currently hold). Id. at 80 (acknowledging the need to "understand[]
how, where and when spectrum resources are being used," and recommending that "the
FCC and NTIA ... develop scientific, statistically valid methods to measure and report the
utilization of spectrum bands between 225 MHz and 3.7 GHz." (citations omitted)). At the
present time, there is little agreement about how to measure "efficient" spectrum use. See
generally, COMMERCE SPECTRUM MGM'T ADvISORY COMM., DEFINITIONS OF EFFICIENCY IN
SPECTRUM USE, (2008), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications /spectral_
efficiencyfinal.pdf. See also SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 21 ("The Task Force also
attempted to develop a methodology for measuring spectrum efficiency. It concluded that
while it is generally easiest to assess technical efficiency on a per-device basis in terms of
bits/seconds/hertz, after reviewing the comments and the record, it was neither possible nor
appropriate to select a single, objective metric for comparing spectrum efficiency across
different radio services. Any metric would, inherent in its assumptions, provide advantages
to one service or another. In addition, measuring technical efficiency does not provide any
information with respect to economic efficiency.").
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Beyond the need for greater visibility into spectrum licensing and
usage, there is relatively little agreement about the role government should
play in facilitating secondary market transactions. Some economists argue
that secondary markets are already operating relatively efficiently, that they
will continue to do so if the FCC were simply to grant increased flexibility
to existing licensees, and that extensive government intervention is
therefore not required.134 For example, a recent study by John Mayo and
Scott Wallsten concludes:
[T]he FCC has radically reduced the time it takes to approve trades,
making the system more akin to notification than to approval. We also
find that a large amount of spectrum changes hands each year. For
example, the average amount of PCS spectrum in terms of MHz-Pops
that changed hands each year between 2004 and 2008, not including
leases, was approximately equal to the mount of spectrum auctioned
by the FCC in the 2006 AWS auction.
Other economists have argued that various market failures, including
transaction costs, fractured or ambiguous property rights, and "hold-out"
problems, are likely to prevent spectrum markets from operating efficiently
in many cases, and that government therefore needs to take a more active
role.1  Proposals to address such problems include more clearly defining
and clarifying the package of rights associated with spectrum licenses
(including specifically defining interference limits), auctioning off
"overlay" rights giving winners exclusive rights to negotiate with
incumbents, or orchestrating auctions in which incumbent spectrum
134. See, e.g., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 5 ("In
promoting secondary markets, the Commission should generally remove restrictions and not
mandate the terms upon which spectrum markets emerge . . . . Instead of either preventing
or requiring a secondary market, the Commission should quickly restructure its rules to
allow a secondary market.").
135. See Mayo & Wallsten, supra note 127. See also Crocioni, supra note 44, at 460
(concluding that "[tihere appear to be no strong reason to conclude that [hoarding and
concentration] may be larger [risks] than in any other sector of the economy.").
136. See, e.g., Efficiency ofFCC Spectrum Auctions, supra note 17, at 728 ("Postauction
transactions are often made difficult by strategic behavior between parties with private
information and market power. The experience with the cellular lotteries is a case in point. It
took a decade of negotiations and private auctions for the eventual service providers to
acquire desirable packages of licenses from the lottery winners. Efficient auctions are
possible before assignments are made but may become impossible after an initial
assignment. The problem is that the license holder exercises its substantial market power in
the resale of the license. For this reason, it is important to get the assignment right the first
time." (citation omitted)).
137. See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 5.
138. See Comment Submitted by Thomas W. Hazlett, International Comparison and
Consumer survey Requirements in the Broadband Data Improvement Act, FCC GN Docket
No. 09-47 (rel. Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://fiallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document
/view?id=7020353683.
121Number 1]
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 121 2011-2012
122 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL [Vol.64
holders can voluntarily put their spectrum on the market in return for a
portion of the proceeds.
The NBP acknowledges there is at least "some evidence" secondary
markets have been effective in transferring spectrum among current
holders:
[T]here have been thousands of secondary-market transactions
involving mobile broadband licenses over the last several years. These
have included license transfers, including partitioning and
disaggregation, and spectrum leases, thus providing some evidence that
the FCC's policies have enabled 'spectrum to flow more freely among
users and uses,' ai envisioned in the Commission's Secondary Markets
Policy Statement.
Despite this assessment, the NBP indicates there may be occasions when
the government should play the role of "third-party auctioneer," and
specifically proposes the use of "incentive auctions."14 1 As described in the
Plan:
[T]he FCC could act as a third-party auctioneer for the private
exchange of spectrum between willing sellers and buyers, similar to a
fine art auction. Alternatively, the FCC could offer a revenue-sharing
enhancement to the existing spectrum auction system, in which some
portion of revenues generated by an auction are shared between the
U.S. Treexy and incumbent licensees who agree to relinquish their
licenses.
The incentive auction proposal represents an innovative effort to combine
the advantages of secondary markets (which give incumbents incentives to
relocate) with the putative advantages of government auctions (which allow
government to restructure and "repack" license rights in order, at least in
theory, to increase their value to the ultimate users).143 The Plan explains
its choice of incentive auctions over the auctioning of overlay rights on the
139. See DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 13-20.
140. NBP, supra note 1, at 83 (citations omitted). The Plan also calls for examining
some technical changes in the FCC's secondary market rules. ("In particular, the FCC
should examine additional positive incentives that may assist in the development of
secondary markets, such as reducing secondary market transaction costs like lease filing
costs, and encouraging and facilitating the use of dynamic spectrum leasing arrangements
that harness emerging technologies.").
141. Id. at 81. The NBP proposes to apply incentive auctions to both MSS and ATV
spectrum. With respect to the latter, it proposes to (a) revise broadcast spectrum licenses so
as to "repack" stations, (b) permit stations to share spectrum, so that two (or conceivably
more) stations could broadcast from the same facilities, using the same 6 MHz blocks of
spectrum, and (c) conduct an auction of spectrum which broadcasters decided to put up for
sale. See generally id. at 88-92.
142. Id. at 81-82 (citation omitted).
143. See, e.g., Kwerel & Williams, supra note 46, at i ("By ensuring that most
interdependent spectrum is up for sale at the same time, this proposal would facilitate a
rapid and efficient restructuring of spectrum rights and use.").
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grounds that "these piecemeal voluntary negotiations [subsequent to an
overlay auction] between new licensees and incumbents introduce delays as
well as high transaction costs as new licensees contend with holdouts and
other bargaining problems."'144
The NBP's proposal for incentive auctions thus embraces the need for
government to step in to address market failures in secondary spectrum
markets by actively engaging in market design and acting as a third-party
auctioneer. What remains unclear is whether the benefits of such an
approach would exceed the costs. On one hand, a purely market-oriented
approach would undeniably face the high transaction costs and other
barriers to which the NBP points. On the other, the incentive auction
approach also has potential for costs and delays-beginning with the need
for Congressional approval.145
As noted above, there is no apparent consensus on the ideal role for
government in establishing and facilitating secondary markets. What can be
said is that the costs of error-in either direction-could be extremely high,
holding the potential to delay by many years the redeployment of a very
valuable economic resource in a crucial sector of the economy.146 Thus,
there is a clear need for additional research into the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of different approaches.1 47
144. NBP, supra note 1, at 82. This conclusion is echoed in the technical paper released
subsequently. See OBI Technical Paper, supra note 3, at 25 ("The downside of [an overlay]
auction is that incumbents may choose never to clear the band or may take a very long time
to negotiate a clearing.").
145. Perhaps surprisingly, the legislation, introduced by Senator Rockefeller and
Representative Boucher, won the support of the National Association of Broadcasters,
which stated that it has "no quarrel with incentive auctions that are truly voluntary . . . ."
Rockefeller Spectrum Bill Endorses Voluntary Spectrum Return Concept, RBR.COM (Aug.
6, 2010, 1:52 AM), http://www.rbr.com/tv-cable/26529.html.
146. The question of what role the FCC should play in reallocating spectrum was
carefully considered by an FCC working group in 2002. The working group developed
seven criteria that the Commission could use to determine what type of mechanism to
choose. See SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 51. One of the options listed by the report was
"expanded rights," which it described as follows: "Under [expanded rights] option, the
Commission grants expanded flexible rights directly to incumbents through modification of
their existing licenses. Potential new entrants are not able to bid for or otherwise obtain
these expanded rights, except by acquiring the licenses from incumbents through the
secondary market. This option has been used by the Commission in several bands. For
example, in the CMRS Flexibility proceeding, the Commission granted CMRS providers the
right to provide fixed in addition to mobile services under their existing licenses." See
DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 19-20 for a similar discussion.
147. The OBI Technical Paper details the FCC's efforts to develop an empirical model
capable of predicting the potential benefits of various approaches to reallocating ATV
spectrum, including channel sharing and the repacking of channels. Unfortunately, the
model is at an early stage of development and not yet capable of predicting the effects of
incentive auctions. OBI Technical Paper, supra note 3, at 5 ("For example, once
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4. Defining Interference Standards
Spectrum reform advocates assert that the imposition by the FCC of
technological standards designed to prevent "harmful interference" is
economically inefficient and has slowed innovation. At the same time, they
recognize that government has a role to play, at least initially, in defining
interference standards-that is, in defining the levels at which spectrum
licensees need not suffer interference as well as the responsibility not to
cause interference for other licensees. Indeed, interference protection rights
are a key element of the package of rights parties acquire when they obtain
spectrum licenses. Past government spectrum reform efforts have attempted
to grapple with the definition of interference rights. The NBP, interestingly,
is essentially silent on the topic.
Preventing "harmful interference"l48 is seen by some as the central
objective of spectrum policy.149 Obviously, however, the objective cannot
be to prevent all interference-as doing so would require vastly reducing
the use of spectrum, to say nothing of doing away with electric drills and
blenders. Rather, the objective is to manage interference so as to balance
the costs of reducing interference with the benefits of doing so. so
The task of determining and enforcing the efficiency-maximizing
level of interference is technically complex. Interference can occur as a
result of competing transmissions occurring within the same band, but also
takes the form of "out-of-band" interference in neighboring bands.
Different types of services and technologies vary in their sensitivity to
interference; and, different types of transmissions, even taking place in the
development of this model is complete, the FCC will be able to determine how many
stations in which markets could participate voluntarily in an incentive auction in order to
make progress towards freeing 120 megahertz with the minimal possible impact on service
areas and consumers, or potentially develop alternative scenarios to meet the spectrum
objective. The alpha version of this tool, though it cannot yet provide that degree of insight,
has already assisted in informing recommendations in the Plan and, with other FCC
analytical tools, assessing the potential impact on consumers and broadcasters from various
scenarios. The model is a work in progress. . . .").
148. Section 303(f) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, directs the FCC to
make regulations "it may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations" as the
public interest requires. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303(f)).
149. See, e.g., DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 1 ("The central problem in the use of
the electromagnetic spectrum is 'interference': one party's transmissions interfering with
those of another party in the same (or a neighboring) geographic area and/or spectrum
band.").
150. Id. at 8 ("The appropriate social goal (with respect to interference) should be to
minimize the sum of all relevant costs (including opportunity costs): the costs of
interference, interference abatement, and interference coordination/enforcement.") (citation
omitted).
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same geographic area at the same level of power, may result in different
levels of (or types of) interference (e.g., the very short "burst"
transmissions associated with spread spectrum technology may be too brief
to cause noticeable interference with some services operating in the same
bands). Moreover, identifying the cause of interference can be very
difficult for a number of reasons; including the fact that interference is a
function of weather and other environmental factors which are constantly
changing.1s1
The economic challenge is made still harder by the fact that there are
generally two solutions to interference: to modify the characteristics of the
interfering transmission (e.g., by reducing its power), or to modify the
characteristics of the receiver that is affected (e.g., by installing better
filtering technology). In cases where the party whose transmissions cause
interference and the party whose services are harmed by interference are
one and the same-i.e., so long as the costs of interference are
internalized-that party will have the appropriate incentives to achieve the
efficient level. But in cases where the interfering and interfered with parties
are different, interference constitutes an externality.
The question facing policymakers is whether administrative
procedures and regulations can do a better job than markets and property
rights in achieving the efficient level of interference. Traditionally,
interference management has taken the form of ex ante regulation by the
FCC, which has set geographic boundaries, prescribed transmission
technologies, limited the output of transmitters, and imposed other
conditions on both licensees and devices designed to prevent "harmful
interference."l52 Such a policy conflicts directly with the goal of increasing
flexibility and allowing spectrum to flow to higher-value uses. Moreover,
there is general agreement that it has resulted in a variety of distortions and
uneconomic outcomes. For example, the FCC has typically focused on
policing interfering transmitters, while paying little or no attention to the
(sometimes more efficient) approach of reducing the consequences of
interference by improving receivers.153
151. See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 575-83, for an excellent discussion on
some of these complexities.
152. An exception is the PCS band, where interference limits consist simply of
geographic and frequency-based limits on in- and out-of-band emissions. Kwerel &
Williams, supra note 46, at 45.
153. SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 31 ("As noted earlier, Commission regulations for
controlling interference set forth permissible technical operational parameters for
transmitters. Receiver robustness generally has not been taken into account in Commission
regulations . . . . This transmitter-centric policy is not necessarily efficient in today's
spectrum environment."). The Task Force proposed that the FCC take a more balanced-if
hardly market-oriented-approach going forward by imposing performance standards on
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The administrative approach has also resulted in costly
miscalculations. For example, the FCC approved Nextel's use of the 800
MHz band in the belief that Nextel's services would not interfere with the
transmissions of public safety agencies in neighboring bands.154 As a
result, both Nextel and public safety invested substantial sums in
equipment and infrastructure, only to see those investments degraded by
unanticipated interference. Ultimately, the FCC was forced to engage in a
lengthy and costly exercise in "spectrum swapping," which is still in
process. 5 5  Similarly, as noted above, the FCC's technical rules for
WCS/SDARS spectrum have effectively prevented the efficient use of
WCS for mobile use for more than a decade, since the spectrum was
auctioned in 1997.156
Spectrum reform proponents favor an alternative approach: to define
clearly the rights of spectrum holders to be protected from interference, and
their obligations not to interfere with others, and then allow disputes to be
settled through negotiation and/or case-by-case adjudication. There is
general agreement that government should take the lead, at least initially, in
defining interference standards,157 but there is also agreement that defining
these rights and responsibilities is a difficult task.15 8
receivers. Id. at 21 ("The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider applying
receiver performance requirements, either through incentives, regulatory mandates, or some
combination of incentives and mandates.").
154. See, e.g., LINDA K. MOORE, SPECTRUM POLICY: PUBLIC SAFETY AND WIRELESS
COMMUNICATIONS INTERFERENCE,l (2010), http://www.fas.org/sgplcrs/misclRL32408.pdf
("When the frequencies in the 800 MHz band were first assigned, the FCC did not anticipate
that channels in that band intended for short messages over commercial mobile radio (used
by taxi dispatchers, for example) would-with time, technology, and soaring consumer
demand for wireless service-be converted to a heavily-trafficked national cell phone
network. The commercial allocations at 800 MHz were closely interleaved with public
safety allocations, with the expectation that the (presumably) low-usage commercial
assignments would act as buffers to prevent interference with public safety channels.").
155. See id. See also Letter from Sprint Nextel at 1, Sprint Nextel's Status Report on 800
MHz Band Reconfiguration, WT Docket No. 02-55 (rel. Oct. 3, 2011), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021712460.
156. See generally WCS/SDARS Order, supra note 27, at paras. 5-27 for a summary of
the issues and a procedural history of the Commission's long and heretofore unsuccessful
efforts to resolve them.
157. See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 5 ("To facilitate this
transition to market allocation, the Commission should focus on improving the definition of
interference for existing licensees . . . .").
158. In 2002, the SPTF proposed a new approach to interference management, which
would create a quantitative "interference temperature" benchmark for each band.
Transmissions rising above the interference benchmark would be prima facie considered to
be causing "harmful interference," while those remaining below it would be prima facie
permitted. SPTF REPORT, supra note 39, at 27-30. In 2007, based on a large body of
technical evidence, the FCC dropped the idea in a two-page order, concluding it was "not a
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Some suggest that a relatively simple set of "best guess" standards,
modified over time by negotiation among spectrum rights holders (and,
where necessary, adjudication), would be both more efficient and more
easily, administered than the command and control approach used in the
past, 59 while others argue that simply allowing negotiations between
market participants would be adequate. Still others have argued for the
use of "predictive models" to establish interference boundaries.161 Kwerel
and Williams have suggested that the FCC establish de minimis
performance standards for transmitter emissions, which could be altered
going forward through negotiations between licensees.162 The current
limits on transmissions by PCS licensees have been suggested as a
reasonable first approximation of where these limits (for out-of-band
transmissions) would be set.163 The advantage of this approach is that it
permits licensees to negotiate among themselves to identify the most
efficient level of interference. The problem, of course, is that it still
requires the FCC to set the initial limits. To set such limits, however, would
require the FCC to define the "harmful interference" more precisely than it
has been willing to do in the past.164
workable concept." Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and
Manage Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed,
Mobile and Satellite Frequency Bands, Order, 22 F.C.C.R 8938, para. 2 (2007).
159. DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 7-10. As noted above, advocates of the
"commons" approach take a different tack, suggesting that exclusive spectrum rights (and
hence protection from interference) are unnecessary altogether-at least for many uses-
because new technologies have obviated the interference problem altogether.
160. See, e.g., Comments of Thomas Hazlett & Matthew Spitzer at 5, Establishment of
an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and Manage Interference and to Expand
Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Frequency Bands,
ET Docket 03-237 (rel. April 5, 2004).
161. See, e.g., Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 608.
162. See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 46, at 46-47 ("The initial limit set by
regulation should rule out extreme power levels that have little practical benefit but which,
if left unchecked, could lead to excessive interference risk or harmful strategic behavior. A
reasonable power limit is one that is high enough to accommodate most anticipated
transmitter systems while helping to constrain 'worse case' interference assumptions on the
receiving side. A high degree of precision in setting the limit is not necessary since licensees
will have the ability to reset it more optimally through negotiation, albeit also at some
cost."); see also DACA REPORT, supra note 86, at 7-9 (endorsing the same approach); Evan
Kwerel & John Williams, Defining Spectrum Rights, NTIA Workshop on Improving
Spectrum Management (Feb. 28 - March 1, 2006), http://www.ntia.doc.
gov/forums/2006/specman/ntia-kwerel.pdf.
163. Kwerel & Williams, supra note 46, at 45.
164. See R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better Reception from the
FCC's Spectrum Policy, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 5, para. 6, available at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/archive-search-abstract.cfm?PaperlD=214. Yet another variant
would be to grandfather the existing level of interference protection for each licensee and
allow licensees to negotiate modifications to those parameters. The advantage of this
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The NBP does not directly address the question of establishing
interference standards, at least not in a generic or comprehensive way, but
instead proposes new technical standards for particular bands (e.g., laying
out several potential changes to the technical architecture of the ATV
spectrum, including moving towards a low-power, "cellular"
architecture).165 Thus, it appears that the Plan envisions that for some
bands the FCC will continue to police interference through the
administrative application of government-designed technological standards.
5. Defining Success in Spectrum Reallocation: Market Outcomes
vs. Administrative Goals
The central tenet of the reform consensus is that ultimately markets
rather than regulators should decide how spectrum is allocated. This tenet
rests, in part, on the thesis that regulators are not able to predict accurately
changing demands for spectrum for various uses.166 The NBP is somewhat
ambiguous on both of these issues, but appears in the end to see market
mechanisms as tools for achieving administratively-determined spectrum
allocation objectives.
approach is that it is consistent with the existing allocation of resources: licensees have
invested in infrastructures and deployed services consistent with current levels of
interference. Since renegotiations between licensees will determine (and adjust) interference
parameters over time (as Kwerel and Williams point out), there is no apparent reason to set
the default parameters at any level different from the status quo. Another advantage of this
approach is that it is likely to minimize (and facilitate resolution of) future disputes, since
the current level of interference is a knowable quantity. Thus, as licensees introduce new
technologies and spectrum uses, they will be able to know in advance that the current level
is the level of interference they may cause interference to their neighbors without having to
enter into negotiations or risk sanctions. See, e.g., Cave, supra note 43 ("Trading should be
introduced in a way which minimises transactions costs, consistent with maintaining the
integrity of the spectrum management regime. This will entail giving licensees the freedom
to divide and partition their licences by frequency and geography for subsequent sale. In
these cases, rights and regulatory responsibilities for interference management would be
sold together. Spectrum users should also be able to lease access to frequencies to others. In
these cases, the original licensee would share access to frequencies while retaining
responsibility to the regulator for the conduct of the licence.").
165. NBP, supra note 1, at 90. Similarly, the FCC's approach in the WCS/SDARS Order
was to prescribe revised technical standards, rather than moving towards an interference
standard approach. See WCS/SDARS Order, supra note 27, at paras. 28-301 (prescribing
service rules for WCS and SDARS services).
166. See, e.g., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 3 ("Moreover,
in a dynamic world many things change, including the state of technology, the development
of wireline networks, and the imagination of entrepreneurs to invent new applications for
radio devices. The Commission has recognized that regulators have limited ability to plan
markets .... But auctions for licenses have not changed the underlying system of spectrum
allocation .... With few exceptions, spectrum continues to be offered to the market only as
allocated and no price can be offered to reallocate it from the officially designated use.").
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With respect to government's ability to predict the demand for
spectrum and thus make economically sound decisions about the ultimate
allocation of spectrum to various uses, the NBP acknowledges the reform
consensus view that the supply and demand for spectrum are volatile and
difficult to predict:
Spectrum forecasts all incorporate a range of assumptions about future
network capacity. Demand is difficult to predict due to uncertainties
about future devices and user behavior. Supply is also difficult to
predict since new technologies can change underlying operating costs,
and access to key inputs like b chaul and tower sites can be limited
by regulatory and other barriers.
Nevertheless, despite acknowledging these difficulties, the Plan embraces
specific forecasts of future market conditions and translates these forecasts
directly into predictions of the amount of additional spectrum that will be
required for specific uses (e.g., mobile broadband) over specific time
periods.168 These predictions, in turn, form the basis for specific quantified
goals and objectives (e.g., reallocating 300 MHz to mobile broadband in
the next five years and 500 MHz in the next ten years).169 From the
perspective of the reform consensus, the relevant question is whether these
goals represent notional targets that form the basis for development of
market-oriented policies or, alternatively, represent firm objectives to be
achieved one way or another.
The NBP does not provide a clear answer. On one hand, it indicates a
preference for voluntary exchanges conducted through secondary
marketsi1o and even suggests the amount of spectrum that ultimately is
reallocated will not be determined by the FCC but instead by "self-
correcting market forces,
[T]he use of flexible mechanisms such as incentive auctions to meet
the need for more spectrum ensures that the market will self-correct if
the forecast proves to be inaccurate. If the U.S. needs more than 300
additional megahertz for mobile broadband, prices for spectrum will go
up and market mechanisms will help move spectrum to mobile
broadband use. On the other hand, if the market demands less than that
amount, prices may all and less bandwidth will be made available for
mobile broadband.
167. NBP, supra note 1, at 84.
168. See id. at 84-85.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 85 ("In other cases, the most expedient path to repurposing spectrum to
broadband may be to use incentive auctions or to take other steps to energize the secondary
markets for a particular band.").
171. Id. (emphasis added).
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Leaving the market as the ultimate arbiter, as this statement suggests,
would of course be perfectly consistent with the reform consensus. On the
other hand, the Plan states clearly that if Congress were to refuse to give
the FCC authority to conduct "incentive auctions," it would go forward
with administrative reallocation and "conduct an auction of some or all the
reallocated spectrum in 2012."172 Similarly, the Plan promises to resort to
other spectrum efficiency alternatives "if the incentive auctions do not
yield a significant amount of spectrum . . .."173
At the end of the day, the determination of how much spectrum will
be reallocated, from which uses to which alternative uses, over what period
of time, and so forth, will be decided by various rulemakings; the NBP's
repeated endorsement of market-based approaches suggests such reforms
will be considered.174 What is less clear is how aggressively the FCC will
pursue such reforms and whether, ultimately, it will be prepared to rely on
the market as the ultimate arbiter of whether spectrum is actually being
deployed to its highest value use.1
B. Privatizing Government Spectrum
The largest single holder of spectrum in the United States is the
federal government which, according to NTIA, holds 14.1 percent of
spectrum in the "beachfront" bands below 3.1 GHz on an exclusive basis,
and an additional 54.2 percent on a shared basis.176 There is widespread
agreement that, despite years of reform efforts, much of this spectrum is
either underutilized or utilized inefficiently, and that spectrum should be
reallocated from federal to private use through auctions, leases, or spectrum
sharing arrangements. Despite various efforts at reform, including passage,
in 2004, of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act ("CSEA"),
efforts to release more government spectrum into the marketplace have
172. Id. at 92.
173. Id (citation omitted).
174. In particular, the NBP calls for an internal review of secondary markets to be
completed by the end of 2010. See id. at 83; see also id. at 90 ("The preference is to
establish a voluntary, market-based mechanism to effect a reallocation, such as the incentive
auctions described previously in this chapter.").
175. In another relevant passage, the NBP seems to suggest that administrative
reallocation is a last-ditch tactic for achieving greater flexibility. Id. at 79 ("[The
government's ability to reclaim, clear and re-auction spectrum (with flexible use rights) is
the ultimate backstop against market failure and is an appropriate tool when a voluntary
process stalls entirely."). What is not clear is how the FCC would determine whether
reallocation had "stalled" because of some sort of market failure, as opposed to simply
because the market has revealed that further reallocations would not be efficient.
176. See SPECTRUM POLICY INITIATIVE PLAN, supra note 40, at 4.
177. H.R. 5419, 108th Cong. (2004).
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been cumbersome, slow, and only partially successful. As a result,
government agencies are the largest single source of spectrum that could be
allocated to more productive uses.
The NBP makes three specific recommendations with respect to
government spectrum. First, as noted above, the Plan calls for development
of a "spectrum dashboard," which would provide information on the
licensing and use of all spectrum in the United States; it specifically
recommends that "NTIA should develop similar information on federal
spectrum operations ... should be made accessible through common links,
with the intent of providing users a comprehensive view of combined FCC
and NTIA information." The availability of such information about
government-allocated spectrum would be a significant step forward, as this
information has heretofore never been publicly available in an easily
accessible form or, in many cases, at all.
The Plan's second proposal with respect to government-allocated
spectrum is to strengthen the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act,
which establishes a Spectrum Relocation Fund that allows spectrum
auction proceeds to pay the costs of relocating federal services when
spectrum is reallocated to nonfederal use. The NBP calls for expanding
178. See SPECTRUM POLICY INImIATIVE PLAN, supra note 40, at 19 ("Although NTIA's
spectrum management processes stress efficient and effective use of the spectrum, NTIA
conducts limited oversight. It trusts each agency to ensure that their systems are the most
spectrum efficient practicable. NTIA conducts general reviews of new systems and reviews
agency performance in the normal frequency assignment coordination process. However,
NTIA has generally left to agencies decisions regarding whether a system uses spectrum
appropriately or whether needs can be satisfied using a commercial service or a
nonspectrum technology[.]"). See also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: BETTER KNOWLEDGE NEEDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAY IMPROVE SPECTRUM EFFICIENCY 3 (2004), http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/d04666.pdf ("While NTIA is responsible for managing the federal government's
use of spectrum and ensuring spectrum efficiency, NTIA primarily relies on individual
agencies to ensure that the systems they develop make as efficient use of the spectrum as
possible. Agencies' guidance and policies, however, do not require systematic consideration
of spectrum efficiency in their acquisitions. The lack of economic consequence associated
with the manner in which spectrum is used has also provided little incentive to agencies to
pursue opportunities proactively to develop and use technologies that would improve
spectrum efficiency govemmentwide.").
179. NBP, supra note 1, at 80 (citation omitted). See also id. at 99 n.3 1.(noting that the
NTIA has agreed, in principle, with this recommendation).
180. See SPECTRUM TRANSPARENCY WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT 1, 6 (2010)
("NTIA maintains a Government Master File (GMF) of federal frequency assignments. It is
not in the public domain due to both classified and FOIA-exempt information contained in
it. However, the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) membership does have
full access to it, enabling other federal agencies to understand federal frequency
assignments.").
181. SeeNBP,supranote 1, at 82.
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the types of costs that can be paid for out of the Spectrum Relocation Fund
to include such items as planning and staff costs associated with relocation
and the costs of using commercial services when agencies decide, rather
than recreating government-owned and -operated systems, to instead rely
on commercial services.182 This proposal, which should reduce the bias
government agencies would otherwise have to "self-provide" wireless
services when procuring from a commercial service would be more
efficient, comports fully with the market-oriented reform consensus.
The Plan's third major proposal for government-allocated spectrum is
to allow the NTIA to impose spectrum fees on government spectrum
users.183 Some reform advocates support such fees, on the theory that they
would force the government to face the on-budget costs of their spectrum
usage. It is not entirely clear, however, that they would have the desired
effect, since the ultimate effect would be that one agency (say, the
Department of Defense) would make a "payment" to another (the Treasury
Department). Whether Congressional appropriators would take such fees
into account in balancing the resources made available to agencies is an
open question; it seems highly unlikely, in any case, that the effect would
bear any close relationship to true economic (as opposed to political)
benefits and costs.
Reform advocates have proposed additional steps that might be taken
to encourage federal agencies to free up underutilized spectrum. For
example, Congress should consider applying the model of the Base Closing
and Realignment Commissions ("BRAC") that have been successful in
closing and consolidating unnecessary military bases to the problem of
federal spectrum. Since first employed in 1988, four BRAC commissions
have recommended the closure or realignment of dozens of military bases,
resulting in more than $17 billion in one-time savings and annual savings
of more than $7 billion.184 While the challenges facing federal spectrum
management are not identical to those in the base-closing context (e.g.,
individual members of Congress are not likely to defend agency spectrum
allocations quite as vociferously as they are local military bases), the
182. See id. ("In particular, Congress should revise the CSEA to provide for payments
of relocation funds to federal users that vacate spectrum and make use of commercial
networks instead of alternative dedicated federal spectrum. Expanding the definition of
reimbursable costs to include a federal incumbent's costs incurred to obtain
telecommunications services from another existing network will promote agency use of
shared commercial infrastructure, thereby freeing federal spectrum to be licensed for
broadband deployment.").
183. NBP, supra note 1, at 82.
184. Base Realignment and Closure 2005: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/brac/faqs001.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2011).
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BRAC model would nevertheless have obvious advantages. Most
significantly, it would create a focal point and an independent analytical
process for identifying excess spectrum, and help to overcome political
opposition to transitioning agencies away from patterns of inefficient
185
spectrum use.
Another approach would be to strengthen the role of the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") in identifying and bringing to market
unused or underutilized federal spectrum, as part of the process of
preparing and proposing the President's Budget. OMB should be tasked to
conduct an annual review of federal spectrum use, under which agencies
would be required to justify their spectrum holdings and identify spectrum
that might be available for auction, lease, or sharing arrangements.
Revenues resulting from this process should be included in the President's
Budget, as well as in each Congressional budget resolution. Doing so
would rebalance the incentives of individual agencies (which-no matter
how many "fees" they are required to "pay" to the Treasury-ultimately
have little or no stake in the budget consequences of privatizing their
spectrum) against the incentives of the OMB and the Congressional
committees primarily responsible for fiscal responsibility, as well as the
incentives of taxpayers.
C. Other Policy Goals
Under the command and control model, regulators have often utilized
license restrictions and other spectrum policy tools to pursue policy
objectives that are not directly related to the efficient allocation of spectrum
per se, or which could better be pursued through other means. The best
examples of such policies are the use of spectrum caps, license conditions,
bidding credits, spectrum fees, build-out requirements, and similar tools
designed to prevent "hoarding," foster more competitive market structures,
or promote efficient use of spectrum. Some of these policies, such as
spectrum caps, though de-emphasized in recent years may be on the rise;187
others, such as license conditions, remain very much in vogue.
185. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHLIGHTS: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
OF U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT WITH BROAD STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT Is NEEDED 1,
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03277.pdf ("While active dialogue among key
stakeholders is ongoing, differing priorities have led to little consensus on appropriate
reforms. In addition, the current spectrum-management structure-with multiple agency
jurisdictions and a slow decision-making process-has hindered consideration of whether
fundamental reform is needed. In the past, commissions - such as the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission-have been used to look at major policy change when
complex problems arise.").
186. See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 5-6.
187. Spectrum limits have been de-emphasized, but not eliminated. For example, the
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Such policies may have made sense when spectrum was both scarce
and assigned by administrative fiat, but in a market-oriented system
characterized by spectrum abundance, their benefits are reduced and their
costs increased. A core principle of the spectrum reform consensus is that
such policies should, as a general matter, be avoided.189
On most of these issues, the NBP appears to be at least partially at
variance with the reform consensus. It proposes spectrum fees on private
licensees,190 embraces "construction benchmarks,"191 promotes the notion
of utilizing auction revenues to support new government spending
programs, and hints that spectrum allocation decisions should be made on
the basis of promoting entry or increasing the prevalence of "small
businesses" in the wireless business.192
Concerns that the FCC might use its control over spectrum to embark
on an "industrial policy" approach to change the market structure of the
mobile wireless business were heightened by its decision in Skyterra,
adopted only a few weeks after the NBP was released, to limit the ability of
the two largest wireless carriers, by revenues, not by spectrum, to lease the
MSS/ATC spectrum,193 and by its refusal, in its 14th annual report on
competition in the CMRS marketplace, to repeat previous findings that the
market is "effectively competitive."l94
The spectrum reform consensus does not, of course, endorse the
accumulation of market power in the mobile wireless market (or any other
market). Indeed, at least some reform advocates suggest that market power
is an a ropriate consideration for the allocation of spectrum to private
actors. However, reform advocates also note that flexibility and
FCC continues to rely on a spectrum threshold in its review of CMRS mergers, despite the
fact that its thresholds do not appear to be justifiable as a matter of competition policy. See,
e.g., Michael Katz, "An Economic Analysis of the Spectrum Component of the Federal
Communications Commission's Merger Review Screen," (August 19, 2008).
188. See Skyterra Communs., Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory
Ruling, 25 F.C.C.R.. 3059 (2010) [hereinafter SkyTerra Order].
189. See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 5-6.
190. NBP, supra note 1, at 82.
191. Id. at 88.
192. Id. at 78 ("Additional spectrum is also required to accommodate multiple providers
in a competitive marketplace, including new entrants and small businesses, as well as to
enable wireless services to compete with wireline services.").
193. See Skyterra Order, supra note 188, at 3088-89.
194. Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 16 (2010).
195. See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 13, at 5 ("The
Commission should eliminate all requirements that are not related to interference or anti-
competitive concentration.").
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secondary markets tend to ameliorate market power concerns, if hot
eliminate them altogether,196 and argue that, rather than attempting to
micromanage the distribution of spectrum through ex ante regulation,
spectrum policy should rely on traditional antitrust law and ex post
enforcement. Most importantly, most reform advocates note that
wireless markets in the United States-especially those characterized by
high degrees of spectrum flexibility and secondary market trading-are
highly competitive.198
V. CONCLUSION
The National Broadband Plan has performed a tremendous service by
raising awareness among policymakers and the public at large of the
importance of spectrum allocation policies, the costs current policies are
imposing on consumers and the economy, and the opportunities associated
with reform. Although the Plan stops short of fully embracing the market-
oriented spectrum reform consensus that began with Ronald Coase, the
reforms most economists and many policymakers--of all ideologies and
political stripes-have advocated for nearly two decades, it nevertheless
pays homage to, and in many cases advances, the principles of spectrum
flexibility and tradability that have formed the basis of this consensus. As it
moves ahead to implement its many recommendations through
rulemakings, the FCC will make innumerable choices that will determine
whether, in the end, the NBP results in reforms that allow spectrum to flow
more rapidly to its highest value use.
196. See Martin Cave, Remarks at the Improving Spectrum Management through
Economic or Other Incentives Workshop: International Experiences in Market-Based
Approaches (Mar. 1, 2006), www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntialpublications/spectrumwork
shop_030106.pdf ("Now if there are all sorts of different ways to market in those
downstream activities, both wire based and in spectrum terms using a whole bunch of
different frequencies which potential operators are now entitled to use subject to
liberalization, then you should see these spectrum markets widening and the opportunity for
anybody actually to hoard spectrum, to corner markets, to exclude competitors by denying
them access to this essential in put [sic], that should be with the passage of time sort of go
out the window."); see also Crocioni, supra note 44, at 457 ("In spectrum markets . . .
empirical work shows that spectrum trading and liberalisation [sic] in Guatemala and El
Salvador have led to less concentrated mobile markets.") (citation omitted).
197. See CAVE, supra note 43, at 18-19 ("As with other markets, trading of spectrum
could potentially enable one or more operators to gain and abuse dominance in the spectrum
market or in a 'downstream' market, which uses spectrum as an input. Government needs to
be vigilant against such an outcome, but should deploy the same competition policy tools in
spectrum trading as it does for other input markets. This should be subject to the general
competition regime, relying on an er post analysis of the impact of spectrum trading on
competition in defined markets.").
198. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 7-13.
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